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Abstract
This paper proposes a patent challenge mechanism with partial patent rights pre-
viously granted to the patent-holder as the challenge reward. Transferring patent
rights to a successful challenger raises the incentive to search for patent-defeating prior
art, and, after the discovery of the information, helps deter collusion between the
patent-holder and the challenger. It also reduces costly opportunistic patenting and
therefore improves patent application quality. However, from an ex post point of view,
over-search ensues when the collusion problem is severe. The optimal re-allocation of
patent rights, then, calls for a careful balance between these costs and benefits.
Keywords: Collusion, Patent Challenge, Patent Quality.
JEL codes: K40, O31, O34.
1 Introduction
The patent system, established to encourage innovation, involves costs and benefits.
It aims to strike a balance between losses associated with temporary monopolies and
gains from long-term technological progress (Nordhaus, 1969; Green and Scotchmer,
∗Assistant Professor, IMT Lucca. This is the first chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Uni-
versite` de Toulouse 1. I would like to thank Bernard Caillaud, Vincenzo Denicolo`, Josh Lerner, Simon Ma,
Richard Schmidtke, Jean Tirole, and John Turner for useful comments. Special thanks go to Jean Tirole
for his continuing support and encouragement. Feedback from participants of seminars and conferences at
Toulouse, IMT Lucca, NBER, South Carolina, UCL, Pompeu Fabra, IESE, Heriot-Watt, IIOC 2006, FEMES
2006, and Manchester IP and IT workshop are appreciated. All errors are mine. Comments are welcome
and please send to: jy.chiou@imtlucca.it
1995). However, if a patented technology turns out to be ‘old,’ i.e., already in the
public domain, losses come without compensating benefits. For a patent system to
serve social interests, it is essential to maintain the good quality of issued patents, in
terms of patentability requirements mandated by the patent law.1 In the United States
and other major economies, this task primarily falls on the patent office, though the
private sector also plays an important role.
Among various advantages, private players may have better information than a
public agency (Lemley, 2001). For instance, technology-intensive firms may have a
comparative advantage in assessing the value of an invention, and therefore identifying
those patent applications worthy of detailed examination. Professional researchers
and amateur garage inventors may be more familiar with the state of the art and
know where to ‘dig’ in the public domain to discover the prior art. This information
forms the basis to determine whether an invention represents enough technological
advancement, relative to current knowledge, to justify patent protection. To better
exploit this reservoir of knowledge, a properly designed patent challenge system is
indispensable for a third party to submit useful information and challenge the validity
of an issued patent.
This paper proposes a special challenge mechanism, that is, the re-allocation of
patent rights upon the disclosure of patent-defeating prior art. It asks: After a chal-
lenger presents the information, how much reward should be given to the challenger in
the form of patent rights previously granted to the patent-holder, to what extent can
society withdraw issued patent rights, and should the patent-holder be left with some
residual rights?
Our analysis addresses two incentive problems: Incentives to look for the prior art
and collusion associated with patent challenges. When the prior art is discovered,
most existing procedures mandate the revoking of the patent rights in its entirety.
Since a patent grants monopoly access to an invention, it generates the highest benefit
one can extract from technology users. This benefit gives the challenger a strong
incentive to strike a deal with the patent-holder rather than invalidate the patent
and dissipate monopoly rent (Thomas, 2001; Hovenkamp et al., 2003; Miller, 2003).2
1The three fundamental requirements in most jurisdictions are novelty, non-obviousness (also called ‘in-
ventive step’ in Europe), and usefulness (‘industrial applications’ in Europe).
2In the past decade the Federal Trade Commission has consistently challenged ‘reverse pay-
ment’ in the pharmaceutical industry on the ground that it serves an anticompetitive purpose
where a brand-name drug maker colludes and persuades a generic drug maker to stay off the
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Regarding incentives to search for information, the mere fact that the prior art is not
readily available to patent examiners suggests a non-negligible search cost, which raises
concerns about whether private search incentives align with social interests.
We start the analysis with the ex post stage (after the patent is granted). Our
results suggest that the optimal post-challenge allocation of patent rights responds to
the two incentive issues in a non-trivial and interesting way. In particular, the socially
optimal level of information search is affected by the extent of collusion (Section 3).
Collusion deterrence can be achieved by fully depriving the original patent-holder of
her patent rights, and giving enough reward to the challenger in order to induce prior
art submission, with the amount reflecting the degree of collusion, i.e., the extent to
which the patent-holder and challenger can realize their joint interests. For instance,
when twenty years of monopoly rights are attached to a valid patent, and a successful
challenge will cause full withdrawal from the patent-holder, the latter is willing to
pay up to twenty-year monopoly rent for the challenger’s silence. Given this stake, and
assuming for simplicity that the challenger has no intrinsic interests in the technology,3
let us consider two polar cases.
First suppose that the patent-holder has some (exogenous) difficulty getting the
challenger on board. For example, the challenger is ‘incorruptible’ and heavily dis-
counts any bribery received from the patent-holder, or it is difficult to organize a side
collusive transaction. In this case, a minor reward, say, one year of monopoly rights,
would be sufficient to deter collusion, and so a successful challenge would bring a social
benefit of nineteen years’ reduction on the monopoly loss. When the challenger does
not fully internalize this sizable benefit, there is a classical under-search problem. An
additional reward to the challenger may be necessary to encourage information search.
If, by contrast, collusion is ‘perfect’ such that the challenger and patent-holder can
coordinate to realize their maximal joint profit, then the whole twenty years rights have
to be given to the challenger to prevent collusion. In other words, ex post the monopoly
rights will not be reduced, whether there is a challenge or not. A successful challenge
only causes a transfer of the whole twenty rights from one hand to the other, and any
information search, from an ex post point of view, is a pure rent-seeking activity and
market by virtue of the latter’s ability to strike down or invent-around the patent covering
the targeted brand-name drug. See the statement of Commissioner J. Leibowitz, prepared be-
fore the Special Committee on Aging of the U.S. Senate on July 20, 2006 (available online at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenate07202006.pdf.)
3In later discussion we consider a more complicated case where the challenger is also a use of the patented
technology. The insight, however, remains the same.
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thus socially wasteful. To overcome this over-search problem, in this extreme case the
optimal policy should treat the original patent-holder leniently and leave all patent
rights in the hands of the original owner, and no challenge should take place.
Despite the ex post cost of over search, patent challenges may deliver some ex ante
benefits. In Section 4 we show that they can discipline patent applicants’ opportunistic
behavior and raise patent quality. A sound policy, then, calls for a careful balance
between ex post rent-seeking costs and ex ante benefits of higher patent quality.
To conclude the paper, in Section 5 we discuss some implementation issues as well
as future research. We first argue why employing this mechanism would improve the
current situation, and why we are in favor of using patent rights as a challenge reward
as opposed to, say, a monetary reward. Because of the critical role the extent of
collusion plays in shaping the optimal mechanism, we also offer some ideas about how
to measure this parameter, with respect to the market structure and patent quality,
respectively.
□ Related literature and reform proposals: The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) has been repeatedly criticized for issuing low quality
patents.4 With dubious quality control at the USPTO, it is troublesome to observe
some challenger-unfriendly features of the U.S. post-grant challenge system, patent
re-examination, and the fact that there are relatively few re-examination requests.5
Compared with its European counterpart, patent opposition, the U.S. system signifi-
cantly restricts the issues that can be raised in a challenge, limits the extent to which a
challenger can participate in the procedure, and limits appeals.6 Accordingly, a number
4Two ‘you can patent that!?’ examples are “Method of executing a tennis stroke,” U.S. patent 5,993,336,
and “Method of swinging on a swing,” U.S. patent 6,368,227. The swing patent is granted on April 2002 to
a five-year-old son of a patent lawyer. A less amusing example is Amazon’s “one-click” patent, U.S. patent
5,960,411, which helped Amazon win a preliminary injunction against its major competitor, Barnes & Noble,
just before the 1999’s Christmas season. Statistical studies present similar concerns. Quillen and Webster
(2001) shows that, after taking into account the continuation application and continuation-in-part applica-
tions, the USPTO’s allowance rate (the number of applications allowed divided by the number filed) in the
mid-1990s is 95%, compared to 68% and 65% for the European and Japanese patent offices, respectively.
Farrell and Shapiro (2008) recently argue that low quality patents do have significant economic impact.
5Graham et al. (2003) reports that only 0.3% of patents granted between 1991-8 are reexamined and half
of the requests are brought by holders of the patent.
6In the U.S., a reexamination request can only be based on the ground of prior art citation, i.e., whether
the patent office has missed an important prior art in issuing the patent. In Europe, an opposition can be
filed on issues as diverse as the subject matter, disclosure requirement, etc. For challenger participation,
an inter partes reexamination was introduced by the 1999 legislature: The American Inventors Protection
Act. Before that, U.S. procedure was solely ex parte; a challenger’s role was confined to the submission of
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of reform proposals suggest several procedural changes to the U.S. system, including
introducing an alternative timing, i.e. pre-grant challenges, broadening the grounds on
which to initiate a challenge, and streamlining current procedures to ensure cost effi-
ciency and timeliness, to name a few (FTC, 2003; NAS, 2004; Hall and Harhoff, 2004;
Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).7 These proposals have been incorporated into the Patent Re-
form Act of 2007 introduced into both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.8
Although these procedural reforms deserve serious consideration, their effect would
be constrained by a challenger’s intrinsic incentives in both information search and
patent challenges. Recognizing this limitation, legal scholars have proposed to con-
struct a bounty system to provide a potential challenger with extra monetary incentives.
Thomas (2001) suggests an examination-stage bounty paid by the patent applicant to
a ‘whistleblower.’ Miller (2003) favors a bounty at the litigation stage, and suggests
rewarding the challenger with the patentee’s past profits, which, as we shall see, has a
flavor similar to our approach.9 In fact, bounties have already been initiated by private
efforts. Around 2001-2002, BountyQuest was launched online to serve as a platform to
post and respond to bounties for patent-defeating information.10 After a few years in
existence, it does not seem to work well, and no competing firm has appeared despite
widespread complaints about poor patent quality.
Most of the preceding proposals, including the reform bill under discussion, take
as granted that a patent is fully invalidated after a successful challenge. By contrast,
the Hatch-Waxman Act prescribes a very different regime for the U.S. pharmaceu-
tical industry. Under this act, a successful challenger is rewarded with a 180-day
an initial statement of why a patent should not be granted, together with supporting evidence, while the
patent-holder could fully communicate with the patent office. The higher level of participation permitted in
inter partes reexamination, however, entails limited means of appeal: issues that are raised, or could have
been raised during reexamination cannot be readdressed in later litigation involving the same challenger.
By contrast, there is no such restriction in the European opposition, and both the challenger as well as the
agency are allowed more active roles. The Opposition Division of the European Patent Office can search for
new prior art and pursue cases on its own, even if private parties want to settle and withdraw the case.
7. For a general discussion, see the special issue of Berkeley Technology Law Review (2004) 19(3). Some
commentators advocate a shift toward the European opposition process and provide estimations of the
benefit the U.S. could realize by adopting the European system (Graham et al., 2003; Graham and Harhoff,
2005; Levin and Levin, 2003).
8The House version was sponsored by Representative H. Berman (H.R. 1908) and has passed on Sep. 7,
2007. The Senate version, sponsored by Senator P. Leahy (S. 1145), however, has been taken off the schedule
(last checked Nov. 2008).
9We provide a preliminary analysis of the bounty system in Appendix E.
10Official website: http://bountyquest.master.com (last visit on November 23, 2005). Somewhat amus-
ingly, the founder of BountyQuest applied for a patent on the business model of the company.
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monopoly right to market a generic version of the drug covered by an invalidated
patent. Thus, the act provides a successful challenger with a shorter but still positive
period of monopoly.11 As we are aware of, only Choi (2005) has mentioned applying
the Hatch-Waxman scheme to other industries, but doesn’t provide a formal analy-
sis. The main contribution of this paper is thus to provide a formal treatment of the
Hatch-Waxman type mechanism and examines factors driving its optimal shape. To
the best of our knowledge, no previous work has formally addressed this issue, or more
generally, the optimal design of a post-grant challenge mechanism.
Another strand of literature considers patent-granting as a two-stage process, which
consists of both patent office examination and post-grant private challenges. Scholars
put different emphases on either stage and derive different policy implications. Lemley
(2001)’s ‘rational ignorant’ patent office suggests that, due to the private challenger’s
information advantages discussed above, it would be more cost efficient to rely on
private litigation to weed out bad patents rather than reforming the patent office.
Contrarily, Farrell and Merges (2004) and Chiou (2008) raise several limitations of
private challenges, such as asymmetric stakes and asymmetric information between
the patent-holder and challenger.12 As a consequence they argue that the problem
should be addressed more at the ‘upstream’, patent examination stage, either the
patent office should play a more important role, or the applicant should be given more
incentives to help the examination process. Our stance in this paper is that no matter
how important the patent office is, it would be unrealistic to expect the patent office
to do a perfect job. Private challenges remain an indispensable means of improving
patent quality, and thus the design of a challenge mechanism is a worthy topic.
2 Model
The authority in charge of patent institutions, namely, Congress or courts, designs
challenge policy. Given the patent institution, an inventor 퐴 decides whether to un-
11To be more precise, the 180-day exclusivity period provides only quasi-monopoly rights. A controversial
practice called ‘authorized generics’ allows brand drug makers to license to other generic firms and compete
with the first challenger in the generic market.
12Farrell and Merges (2004) suggests that asymmetric stakes may come from the pass-through problem
and the public goods nature of a patent challenge, which happens when the patent rights are fully revoked
after a successful challenge. Chiou (2008) shows that case selection associated with asymmetric information
may lead to litigation against a strong patent, while a weak patent may be settled and escape a court
challenge.
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dertake a R&D project; if so, she applies for and is granted a patent,13 and then licenses
her patent. Technology users 퐵푖, 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 푁}, 푁 > 1, decide whether to buy the
license. One of the users, 퐵푗, will be endowed with the information search capacity. He
then has to decides whether to search for prior art, and once the information is found,
whether to submit it to the patent authority or to collude with the patent-holder.
Assume that all private parties are protected by limited liability.
□ Technology: In the basic model the inventor side is constructed in a simple
adverse selection manner. The inventor 퐴 undertakes a R&D project with cost 푘 ∈
{0,퐾}, 퐾 > 0. A positive cost corresponds to a technology breakthrough: Relative to
current stock of knowledge, a technology is a true invention if and only if it requires a
positive cost, 푘 = 퐾. In contrast, if 푘 = 0, the technology already exists in the public
domain. Only the inventor is aware of the true 푘; all other players share belief that
푃푟(푘 = 퐾) = 훼 ∈ (0, 1). We call 퐴 an honest (opportunistic) inventor when 푘 = 퐾
(푘 = 0, respectively).
The technology’s value is independent of 푘, though.14 User 퐵푖 values the technology
at 푣푖 ∈ {푣
ℎ, 푣푙}, with 푣ℎ > 푣푙, which is private information to 퐵푖. The 푣푖s are i.i.d.
with 푃푟(푣푖 = 푣
ℎ) = 휌 ∈ (0, 1). Define 푣푒 ≡ 휌푣ℎ+(1− 휌)푣푙, 휋 ≡ 휌푣ℎ, and 푑 ≡ (1− 휌)푣푙.
Assume 휋 > 푣푙, so that the monopoly licensing fee is 푣ℎ, and the ex post inefficiency
or deadweight loss associated with monopoly is 푑. In aggregate, define 푉 푒 ≡ 푁푣푒,
Π ≡ 푁휋, and 퐷 ≡ 푁푑.
When 푘 = 0 and so there is no innovation, a piece of patent-defeating prior art
(henceforth, prior art) can be found indicating that indeed no patent protection should
be granted. Assume the prior art exists if and only if 푘 = 0, and it is a piece of hard
information. When 푘 = 퐾, there is no way to forge a non-existing information. But
when it exists and has been found, the searcher can withhold the prior art and collude
with the patent-holder (Tirole, 1986). In terms of legal requirements of patentability,
this is mostly consistent with the novelty criterion, which has a clear definition of what
information can be considered as patent-defeating, and the patent examination body’s
problem is to find, but not interpret the information.
The information structure implies that the patent office errs only by granting bogus
patents (those which don’t meet patentability criteria). Given existence of prior art,
13Nothing would be changed if invalid patents were granted with probability less than one.
14This captures the idea that some bogus patents, although they do not satisfy the patentability criteria,
cover valuable technologies.
7
the searcher 퐵푗 can spend a cost 푐(훽) to find the information with probability 훽, with
푐′ and 푐′′ > 0, 푐
′′′
≥ 0, 푐(0) = 푐′(0) = 0, and 푐′(1) =∞.
□ Patent protection: We exclude public funds and assume that the patent au-
thority’s only policy tool is patent protection, or ‘patent power’ 휃 ∈ [0, 1]. When
endowed with 휃, the patent-holder charges a licensing fee 푣ℎ and extracts a monopoly
rent 휃휋 from each user. User 퐵푖 then gets (1− 휃)푣푖, and the expected deadweight loss
is 휃푑. A more powerful patent (휃 higher) rewards the owner with higher profit, at the
cost of greater ex post social loss.
To give the patent authority more policy flexibility, we allow for shared ownership
of patent rights and assume no efficiency loss from such sharing. If two parties are
granted patent protection 휃′ and 휃′′, with 휃′+ 휃′′ ∈ [0, 1], they jointly exercise a patent
with power 휃′ + 휃′′.
A straightforward example of a policy instrument is sequential patent rights: One
party receives ownership over a period [0, 푇 ′], and the other over the period (푇 ′, 푇 ′′],
with 휃′ ≡
∫ 푇 ′
0 푟푒
−푟푡푑푡 and 휃′′ ≡
∫ 푇 ′′
푇 ′
푟푒−푟푡푑푡, where 푟 > 0 is the interest rate. This
instrument perhaps is also the one that could be readily applied across industries.
Alternatively, we could interpret 휃 as patent scope. Suppose that for each user 퐵푖,
the patented technology has a continuum of uses distributed on a unit line [0, 1]. Each
use has either high (푣ℎ) or low (푣푙) value. For simplicity, assume perfect correlation
among uses for the same user. Summing over different uses, the technology is worth
either 푣ℎ or 푣푙 to 퐵푖. Again, this is 퐵푖’s private information; others hold the common
belief 휌. Let the patent scope be a subset of the unit line, with measure 휃. For instance,
each use corresponds to a patent claim. The patent-holder charges a monopoly price
푣ℎ over the uses that fall within the scope of the patent, and 퐵푖 produces without
licensing for uses outside the patent scope. The revenue and deadweight loss associated
with patent protection then take the same linear form as described above. Shared
ownership can be thought of as two parties that are granted patent rights controlling
non-overlapping uses, or different patent claims with measure 휃′ and 휃′′.
To induce innovation, the honest innovator’s incentive constraint is
(퐼퐶)퐴 : 휃Π ≥ 퐾 ⇒ 휃 ≥ 휃
∗ ≡
퐾
Π
. (1)
Assume 0 < 퐾 ≤ Π and so 휃∗ ∈ (0, 1]. Throughout the paper, the patent system aims
at inducing innovation. Absent a challenge, the patent protection should be at least
휃∗.
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Figure 1: Timing
Referring to Figure 1, the timing of the game is as follows:15
∙ At date 0, the patent authority designs the challenge policy;
∙ at date 1, 퐴 decides whether to undertake a R&D project of cost 푘. The patent
application and grant follow the expenditure of 푘;
∙ at date 1.5, the searcher 퐵푗 makes a search decision;
∙ at date 2, the value of the technology 푣푖 is observed by user 퐵푖;
∙ at date 3, when 퐵푗 has found the prior art, he decides whether to challenge the
patent or to collude with the patent-holder; and
∙ at date 4, patent rights are allocated and licensing takes place.
We assume that ex ante all users 퐵푖, 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푁}, are equally likely to have
search capability, and at time 1.5, one of them, 퐵푗 is endowed with this capacity. His
identity, however, remains unknown to other uses and the patent authority as long as
he doesn’t initiate a patent challenge. For simplicity, we assume that 퐵푗 engages in
search without learning the true value of 푣푗 . After learning 푣푗, and if 퐵푗 has found the
prior art, he then decides whether to collude with 퐴 or to submit the information to
the patent authority.
□ Collusion: In the collusion subgame, the patent-holder is assigned the whole
bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the challenger. In this offer,
퐴 may need to transfer a portion of patent rights (or, equivalently, part of monopoly
profit). Following the literature on collusion in organizations, we assume that a side
contract is enforceable, but introduce a side transfer efficiency parameter to capture
imperfect collusion (Tirole, 1986). If 퐴 makes a private transfers 휃ˆ of patent rights,
the recipient receives only 휆휃ˆ, 휆 ∈ [0, 1]. The loss (1−휆)휃ˆ may be due to a probability
1 − 휆 that such side transfers can be detected; or, to avoid suspicion, the colluding
15In Appendix C to E , we consider different variants of the basic model, including: the single downstream
user case, 푁 = 1 (Appendix C); multiple searchers with simultaneous (Appendix D); and the introduction
of monetary instruments as well as the possibility of ‘type II error,’ i.e., the true inventor may be rejected
patent protection (Appendix E). Limited liability constraint is also relaxed in the third extension.
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parties have to trade in an indirect and less efficient way. Note that limited liability
has to be satisfied in this subgame, too. 퐴 has no cash to pay as a bribe, and cannot
give away more monopoly rights than what she receives from the patent authority.
Assume that all users are subject to the same policy in the absence of a patent
challenge. By submitting the prior art 퐵푗’s identity is known to the patent authority
and so different patent power can be imposed on 퐵푗 and on other users 퐵−푗, while all
퐵−푗 still face the same policy. To shorten the exposition, we restrict the policy space
by assuming that, after submission, 퐵푗 is no longer subject to any licensing obligation.
He can freely use the technology and enjoy the whole production surplus 푣푗 . (In the
end of Section 3 we will provide a condition under which this restriction is part of
the optimal policy.) A policy, then, is a triplet (휃¯, 휃퐴, 휃퐶), where 휃¯ is the patent right
awarded to 퐴 when there is no challenge; and when 퐵푗 submits the prior art, the
patent authority reallocates patent rights 휃퐴 (휃퐶) to 퐴 (퐵푗 , respectively) against other
users 퐵−푗. Define 푆 ≡ (푁−1)휋. Post challenge the inventor 퐴 (challenger 퐵푗) garners
profit 휃퐴푆 (휃퐶푆, respectively) from other users 퐵−푗 .
3 Ex Post Cost of Over-Search
Two issues arise in the ex post context. When making a search decision, a searcher may
not fully internalize all benefits of a patent challenge (the free rider problem). And
after discovery, a potential challenger may prefer to collude with the patent-holder and
share the monopoly profit extracted from other users, rather than submit prior art to
the patent office or court and invalidate the patent (the collusion problem). We assume
that private players cannot organize themselves to overcome the free rider problem.16
Concerning collusion, in our main analysis we address the optimal policy with full
collusion deterrence.17 (Appendix B provides a case where this may not hold.)
We first characterize the optimal collusion-free allocation, 휆 = 0, in order to il-
lustrate the free rider problem. Given a policy (휃¯, 휃퐴, 휃퐶), the private challenger’s
optimization program is:
max
훽
[훼+ (1− 훼)(1 − 훽)](1 − 휃¯)푣푒 + (1− 훼)훽(푣푒 + 휃퐶푆)− 푐(훽).
16Note that free riding persists as long as private mechanisms cannot force participation. Another problem
is that ex ante it may be difficult to identify potential users.
17Appendix D addresses the case of multiple-searcher under collusion-proof mechanisms, where, similar to
the patent race literature, the duplication of search cost may also lead to over-search.
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When the prior art doesn’t exist (with probability 훼) or when it exists but 퐵푗 fails to
find it (with probability (1− 훼)(1 − 훽)), 퐵푗 faces 퐴’s patent with power 휃¯. When 퐵푗
succeeds in finding the information (with probability (1 − 훼)훽), by assumption he is
exempted from any licensing obligation and can enjoy the whole production surplus 푣푒,
plus the additional reward 휃퐶 exerted against other technology users. The privately
optimal level of search intensity, 훽푠, is determined by:
(1− 훼)(휃¯푣푒 + 휃퐶푆) ≡ 푐′(훽푠).
Consider a policy resembling the status quo situation: (휃¯, 휃퐴, 휃퐶) = (휃∗, 0, 0), that
is, no one gets any monopoly rights after a successful challenge. Under this policy, the
social benefit of patent invalidation is the saving of the aggregate monopoly deadweight
loss, 휃∗퐷, but the private search incentive is driven by a benefit of 휃∗푣푒. Under-search
ensues whenever 퐷 > 푣푒, or, 푁 −1 > (휋/푑). To encourage search it may be optimal to
give 퐵푗 an extra reward, 휃
퐶 > 0. The following proposition gives the exact condition.
(All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.)
Proposition 1. (Collusion-free allocation). Without collusion concerns, the optimal
patent protection is 휃¯ = 휃∗ when there is no patent challenge; and post-challenge the
patent-holder receives 휃퐴 = 0, and the challenger receives a positive reward if there is a
serious under-search problem and a reward can significantly boost private search, i.e.,
the optimal 휃퐶 > 0 if
휃∗
[
(푁 − 1)푑 − 휋
] ∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
∣∣∣
휃¯=휃∗,휃퐶=0
> 훽푠0(푁 − 1)푑, (2)
where 훽푠0 is the privately optimal search intensity evaluated at 휃¯ = 휃
∗ and 휃퐶 = 0.
Starting from 휃퐶 = 0, a marginal increase of 휃퐶 entails deadweight loss proportional
to 훽푠0(푁 − 1)푑, but society benefits from a more intensive search (∂훽
푠/∂휃퐶 > 0). To
balance the two effects, condition (2) says that the optimal policy calls for 휃퐶 > 0 when
the under-search problem is severe (훽푠0 low), or when the incentive effect is significant
(∂훽푠/∂휃퐶 large).
□ Collusion-proof challenge mechanism: Recall that in collusion subgame
the patent-holder 퐴 makes an enforceable take-it-or-leave-it offer. The analysis of op-
timal side contracting is significantly simplified by the restriction that, after a challenge,
퐵푗 can freely use the technology. It implies that 퐴 can only induce 퐵푗’s cooperation
by promising him a portion of the monopoly rent levied on other uses 퐵−푗 . Collusion
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gains flow from the higher profit collected from 퐵−푗. Given 휆 ∈ (0, 1] and patent policy
(휃¯, 휃퐴, 휃퐶), define
Δ휃 ≡ 휆(휃¯ − 휃퐴)− 휃퐶 ,
which is the gains of trade from collusion. The maximal bribe 퐴 is willing to offer is
휃¯−휃퐴, which has to be discounted by 휆 to reflect the amount transferable to 퐵푗; while
퐵푗 must get at least 휃
퐶 to participate in collusion. Assume that 퐴 has incentives to
make the collusive offer only when it is strictly better to do so. The following lemma
derives the optimal side contract.
Lemma 1. (Optimal side contract). Collusion takes place if and only if there are gains
from doing so, Δ휃 > 0. When Δ휃 > 0, in the optimal side contract 퐵푗 receives a free
license.
Because side transfer of patent rights entails an efficiency loss (휆 ≤ 1), to economize
on its use, 퐴 optimally grants 퐵푗 a free license and leaves him the whole production
surplus 푣푗 . This in turn implies that the patent authority can fully replicate the optimal
side contract, thus the collusion-proofness principle holds.
Lemma 2. (Collusion-proofness principle). The patent authority optimally deters col-
lusion in the multiple-user, single-challenger case.
Now we can write down the patent authority’s optimization program.18
(풫)푠 : max
휃¯,휃퐴,휃퐶
풲푠 = 훼(푉 푒 − 휃¯퐷 −퐾) + (1− 훼)
{
(1− 훽푠)(푉 푒 − 휃¯퐷)
+ 훽푠[푉 푒 − (휃퐴 + 휃퐶)(푁 − 1)푑]
}
− 푐(훽푠)
푠.푡. (퐼퐶)퐴 : 휃¯ ≥ 휃
∗, (퐶푃 ) : Δ휃 ≤ 0,
(퐼퐶)퐶 : 푐
′(훽푠) ≡ (1− 훼)(휃¯푣푒 + 휃퐶푆).
The patent authority faces three constraints: To encourage innovation the true inven-
tor’s incentive constraint (퐼퐶)퐴 has to be satisfied; by Lemma 2 collusion should be
deterred in this case, thus constraint (퐶푃 ); and the challenger’s search intensity is
dictated by his private incentives as described in (퐼퐶)퐶 .
18Lemma 2 still holds if 퐵푗 ’s search decision is made after learning the private value 푣푗 . In fact, the
policy restriction that 퐵푗 automatically gets a free license makes his private information irrelevant. The
only difference introduced by this alternative timing is that 퐵퐽 ’s optimal search intensity is contingent on
푣푗 ∈ {푣
푙, 푣ℎ}: for 푡 ∈ {푙, ℎ}, 푐′(훽푠푡 ) ≡ (1 − 훼)(휃¯푣푡 + 휃
퐶푆). This would complicate the analysis without
providing further insight.
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When these constraints are satisfied, the true inventor will engage in innovation,
which creates a total value of 푉 푒, but has to be subtracted from innovation cost 퐾 and
deadweight loss of patent protection 휃¯퐷. On the other hand, when the technology is
already in the public domain, without a challenge the society suffers from unwarranted
deadweight loss 휃¯퐷, and with the help of a patent challenge this loss can be reduced
to (휃퐴 + 휃퐶)(푁 − 1)푑, for the challenger will realize full production surplus.
Let 휇 be the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the (퐶푃 ) constraint, and define
휓 ≡ (휃¯ − 휃퐴 − 휃퐶)(푁 − 1)푑− [휃¯ + 휃퐶(푁 − 1)]휋,
which reflects the discrepancy between social and private incentives to search. There
is over-search (under-search) if 휓 < 0 (휓 > 0, respectively).
When 푁 and 훼 are large enough, the optimal 휃¯ = 휃∗. Increasing 휃¯ beyond 휃∗ creates
more deadweight loss, strengthens incentives to collude, and encourages private search.
But even with under-search, if 훼 is not too small, raising 휃퐶 is a more efficient way to
encourage private search.
To determine the optimal 휃퐴 and 휃퐶 , as 휆 increases from zero to one, there may
exhibit three regimes. First note that from 휆 ≤ 1, to deter collusion with the least
social cost the patent authority should re-allocate the patent rights only to 퐵푗, with
휃퐶 = 휆휃∗ and 휃퐴 = 0. However, this allocation rule may be disturbed by inadequate
private search incentives. Referring to Figure 2, there exist 휆ˆ and 휆¯, with 휆ˆ < 휆¯, and
possibly 휆 < 휆ˆ, such that:
(i) Encouraging search: when 휆 ≤ 휆 (if 휆 exists), the optimal 휃퐴 = 0 and 휃퐶 > 휆휃∗.
In this range 휓 is positive and large, i.e., there is a serious under-search issue, and
so a reward of 휆휃∗ doesn’t give 퐵푗 enough search incentives, relative to the social
benefit. As in Proposition 1, it may be desirable to further reward 퐵푗, 휃
퐶 > 휆휃∗;
(퐶푃 ) slacks. This regime may not exist for doing so entails a social cost proportional
to (푁 − 1)푑;
(ii) binding collusion-proofness: when 휆 ∈ (휆, 휆¯], the optimal 휃퐴 = 0 and 휃퐶 =
휆휃∗. 퐵푗 receives the collusion-deterrence reward 휆휃
∗. As 휆 increases, reduction of
social loss, (휃∗− 휃퐶)(푁 − 1)푑, shrinks, while 퐵푗’s search intensity increases. When
휆 is large enough (휆 > 휆ˆ), 휓 becomes negative and there is over-search. But as
long as the problem of suboptimal private search intensity is moderate (∣휓∣ not too
big), the patent authority sticks to this regime;
(iii) collusion-deterrence cum discouraging search: when 휆 > 휆¯, the optimal
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0 1
(i) (ii) (iii)
휓 < 0휓 < 0
휇 = 0 휇 > 0휇 > 0휇 > 0
휓 > 0휓 > 0
(and significant)(and significant)
휆
휃퐶 > 휆휃∗ 휃퐶 = 휆휃∗ 휃퐶 < 휆휃∗
휃퐴 = 0 휃퐴 = 0 휃퐴 > 0
휆 휆ˆ 휆¯
Figure 2: Ex post optimal policy
0 < 휃퐴 ≤ 휃∗ and 0 ≤ 휃퐶 < 휆휃∗, with 휆(휃∗ − 휃퐴) = 휃퐶 . Rewarding 퐵푗 with 휆휃
∗
leads to very large over-search costs, relative to deadweight loss savings. To dilute
퐵푗 ’s search incentives and at the same time deter collusion, the patent authority
leaves part of the patent rights to the inventor 퐴, 휃퐴 > 0, even after a successful
patent challenge.
Proposition 2. (Collusion-proof allocation). Solving the program (풫)푠, after a patent
challenge: When the collusion problem is not severe, 휆 ≤ 휆¯ (regime (i) and (ii)), the
patent-holder is fully deprived of her patent rights, and the challenger is rewarded with
partial patent rights; but when 휆 > 휆¯ (regime (iii)), the patent-holder retains (partial)
patent rights after a challenge.
Opposed to the collusion-free case, when there is ‘perfect collusion,’ 휆 = 1, the
total patent rights imposed on 퐵−푗 cannot be reduced after the patent challenge. In
order to satisfy the (퐶푃 ) constraint, any reduction in 휃퐴 is accompanied with the same
amount of increase of 휃퐶 . There are no ex post social gains from this re-allocation of
patent rights, and private search driven by 휃퐶 is socially wasteful. It is optimal to set
휃퐴 = 휃∗ and 휃퐶 = 0. The finding of prior art only increases the social surplus to the
extent that 퐵푗 can freely use the technology in his own production, which is always
internalized by 퐵푗.
Remark. The restriction that a successful challenger is no longer subject to patent
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rights may only change the optimal policy in regime (iii). After a challenge, if 퐴
retains some monopoly rights against 퐵푗 , the two may collude even when Δ휃 ≤ 0. For
퐵푗 may be willing to sacrifice 휃
퐶 and collude with 퐴 in order to gain more operation
freedom and enjoy a larger own production surplus. The collusion problem worsens,
but the collusion-proofness principle still holds (for in an optimal side offer 퐴 grants 퐵푗
a free license). This policy could enhance welfare only by discouraging private search,
a concern only in regime (iii).
Suppose that 휆 = 1 and 휃퐴 = 휃∗, and so patent invalidation only concerns 퐵푗.
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Over-search then ensues: After a challenge 퐵푗 can freely use the technology and enjoy
the whole production surplus 휃∗푣푒, but only a portion of this surplus, 휃∗푑, is counted
as ex post social benefit, while 휃∗휋 is a licensing transfer between the patent-holder and
challenger. But if the over-search problem is not too severe, there is no need to provoke
further policy adjustment by subjecting 퐵푗 to 퐴’s patent rights after a challenge. Our
restriction then becomes part of the optimal policy.
To derive the formal condition, fix 휃¯ = 휃퐴 = 휃∗, and introduce 휃퐴푗 as 퐴’s patent
rights against 퐵푗 after a challenge. The latter’s optimal search is determined by
훽ˆ = argmax
훽
(1− 훼)훽(휃∗ − 휃퐴푗 )푣
푒 − 푐(훽) ⇒ 퐹푂퐶 : (1− 훼)(휃∗ − 휃퐴푗 )푣
푒 ≡ 푐′(훽ˆ).
Relevant social welfare consideration is
(1− 훼)[푣푒 − 훽ˆ휃퐴푗 푑− (1− 훽ˆ)휃
∗푑]− 푐(훽ˆ) = (1− 훼)[푣푒 − 휃∗푑+ 훽ˆ(휃∗ − 휃퐴푗 )푑]− 푐(훽ˆ).
퐵푗’s challenge only recovers the social loss (휃
∗ − 휃퐴푗 )푑. The ptimal 휃
퐴
푗 = 0 when
(휃∗ − 휃퐴푗 )
훽ˆ
∂훽ˆ
∂(휃∗ − 휃퐴푗 )
∣∣∣
휃퐴푗 =0
≤
푑
휋
,
where 훽ˆ is evaluated at 휃퐴푗 = 0. ∥
Remark. After a successful challenge, only in regime (iii) does the optimal mechanism
require a sharing of patent rights between the original patent-holder and the challenger.
If there is some cost associated with this shared ownership, this regime will become
less attractive. In the next section, we discuss another reason why regime (iii) may
shrink, namely, the ex ante benefits of patent challenges. ∥
19This is similar to the single-user case considered in Appendix C.
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4 Ex Ante Benefits of Higher Patent Quality
The previous section concentrates on the ex post role of patent challenges. To fully
evaluate the merit of the challenge mechanism, we also need to take into account that
patent challenges may improve patent quality (captured by 훼) by inducing innovation
or by deterring opportunistic patenting in the first place. These ex ante benefits con-
strain the relevancy of ex post over-search and the associated lenient treatment of the
original patent-holder, 휃퐴 > 0.
□ Inducing innovation: So far, we have assumed that an honest inventor has
no chance to game the system with opportunistic patenting (adverse selection). If,
instead, we consider a simple moral hazard element that allows a true inventor to copy
and patent a (equally valuable) technology already in the public domain, to induce
innovation, the inventor’s incentive constraint becomes
휃¯Π−퐾 ≥ (1− 훽)휃¯Π+ 훽휃퐴푆 ⇒ 훽휃¯Π ≥ 퐾 + 훽휃퐴푆. (3)
In this case, to encourage innovation requires both carrot and stick. An honest inventor
needs to be not only compensated for her R&D cost, but also kept away from the
temptation of opportunistic patenting. A policy 휃¯ ≥ 휃∗ fulfills the first purpose and
patent challenges serve the second function. That is, a lower payoff following a challenge
(휃퐴푆 < 휃¯Π) discourages opportunistic patenting. Note that a higher 휃퐶 enables higher
search and challenge intensity, which creates social benefits by reducing the necessary
patent protection 휃¯ to induce innovation. Also, the appearance of 휃퐴 on the right-
hand side of condition (3) suggests that a more lenient policy toward the patent-holder
(휃퐴 higher) would undermine the incentive power of the patent system. Both effects
constrain regime (iii) in Proposition 2.
□ Deterring opportunistic patenting: Another drawback of the policy 휃퐴 > 0
is that it may encourage opportunistic patenting. To illustrate this point, we keep
the honest inventor’s choice set as in the basic model, but modify the opportunistic
inventor’s choice set as follows: With probability 훼′ ≥ 0, there is a cost 푐′ > 0 to copy
the existing technology and prepare for the patent application; and with probability
1− 훼− 훼′ > 0, opportunistic patenting remains costless. If
푐′ ≥ 훽휃퐴푆 + (1− 훽)휃¯Π, (4)
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the portion of opportunistic patenting 훼′ can be deterred. This condition is more likely
to hold when a patent challenge is more likely to happen (훽 larger), and the payoff
after a challenge is lower (휃퐴 smaller).
When condition (4) fails, an issued patent is bogus with probability 1−훼; but when
it holds, this probability falls to
(1− 훼′)− 훼
1− 훼′
≤ 1− 훼.
When (퐶푃 ) is binding, increasing 휃퐶 yields an additional benefit of a higher patent
quality. Again, this concern may increase 휆¯ and shrink regime (iii).
Example. (Two-point search). Consider a simple search technology where 퐵푗 can find
existing prior art with a fixed probability 훽 at a cost 푐. Assume also that 휆 = 1 and
so the (퐶푃 ) constraint is 휃퐴+ 휃퐶 = 휃¯. In a linear structure, it suffices to consider two
cases, either 휃퐶 = 휃¯ or 휃퐴 = 휃¯. Assume
(1− 훼)훽휃¯푣¯ < 푐 ≤ (1−
훼
1− 훼′
)훽휃¯(푣¯ + 푆) and (1− 훽)휃¯Π ≤ 푐′ < 휃¯Π,
and so search deters costly opportunistic patenting. When 휃퐶 = 휃¯ and 휃퐴 = 0, 퐵푗
incurs 푐 to search, but the opportunistic inventor will not spend 푐′ to pursue the patent.
On the other hand, when 휃퐴 = 휃¯ and 휃퐶 = 0, 퐵푗 doesn’t search and the opportunistic
inventor spends 푐′.
The difference in social welfare under the two policies is
풲∣휃퐶=휃¯ −풲∣휃퐴=휃¯ = 훼
′휃¯퐷 + 훼′푐′ − 푐+ (1 − 훼− 훼′)훽휃¯푑.
Less opportunistic patenting improves social welfare by reducing deadweight loss (훼′휃¯퐷+
(1−훼−훼′)훽휃¯푑) and by saving the cost of acquiring a bogus patent (훼′푐′). These ben-
efits are achieved through costly search (푐). The deterrence policy (휃퐶 = 휃¯) is optimal
if the search cost is not too large compared with the cost of opportunistic patenting
(푐−훼′푐′ not large), and the patent quality can be significantly improved (훼′ high).20 ∥
Proposition 3. (Ex ante benefits). A policy that leaves the original patent-holder some
residual rights after a successful challenge, 휃퐴 > 0, impedes social objectives of encour-
aging innovation and deterring opportunistic patenting. When these ex ante concerns
present, regime (iii) in Proposition 2 shrinks (휆¯ increases).
20If 훼′ = 0, 풲∣휃퐶=휃¯ −풲∣휃퐴=휃¯ < 0 and we are in regime (iii).
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By deterring opportunistic patenting and therefore raising the patent application
quality, patent challenges have the further benefits of reducing the patent office work-
load. This in turn may enhance the patent office performance, and create a virtuous
circle emphasized by Caillaud and Ducheˆne (2005) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004).
Remark. (Application fees). When the innovation constraint is characterized by con-
dition (1), the honest inventor receives zero rent under the optimal policy while the
opportunistic inventor’s expected profit is positive. A uniform application fee here
cannot solve the patent quality problem precisely because it fails to distinguish be-
tween the two types of applicants (Caillaud and Ducheˆne, 2005). Plus, after a fee is
imposed the patent rights 휃¯ should be raised to keep the true inventor’s incentive con-
straint satisfied, which in turn would trigger even higher incentives to collude for the
opportunistic patent-holder.
5 Implementation
We conclude the paper with some implementation issues. With the exception of the
pharmaceutical industry in the U.S., the current situation can be described as a special
case in our policy space: 휃퐴 = 휃퐶 = 0, i.e., a successful challenge destroys all the
monopoly rights. This can hardly be optimal whenever there is a danger of collusion,
휆 > 0. Deterring collusion and encouraging information search then requires extra
incentives for the challenger.21
□More gaming behavior? One might argue that a reward 휃퐶 > 0 would actually
trigger more bogus patent applications, for applicants could later strike down their
own patents and enjoy the challenge prize (or arrange someone else to challenge and
then share the prize; another form of collusion). This could happen only when an
opportunistic player has higher incentives to apply for a patent after we move away
from the current system of (휃퐴, 휃퐶) = (0, 0) to (휃퐴, 휃퐶) ∕= (0, 0). But a comparison
of the opportunistic inventor’s payoffs in the two cases shows that the reverse would
21Even though the determination of the optimal mechanism remains an empirical issue, and conceivably it
would be a challenging task to tailor the reward to the theoretically optimal level, we believe that rewarding
a challenger with ‘mild’ patent rights, 0 < 휃퐶 << 휃¯, would bring significant improvement over current
situation. By playing ‘safe,’ a not-so-large 휃퐶 would avoid the risk of triggering ex post over-search. Even
if it cannot solve the collusion problem, this reward would induce more information search, which in turn
would undermine the opportunistic patent-holder’s rent and thus discourage costly opportunistic patenting
as emphasized in Section 4.
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be true. To illustrate this, consider the case of Section 3, and assume 휆 > 0 so
that collusion is a real concern. Under the policy (휃퐴, 휃퐶) = (0, 0), the opportunistic
patentee’s payoff is (1− 훽¯푠0)휃¯Π+ 훽¯
푠
0 휃¯푆, where 훽¯
푠
0 is determined by (1−훼)휃¯푣
푒 ≡ 푐′(훽¯푠0).
(Recall that we let the patent-holder keep the whole bargaining power.)
Now, suppose that the ex post optimal collusion-proof mechanism characterized in
Proposition 2 is adopted. If the reward 휃퐶 is only granted to the first challenger, the
upper bound of the opportunistic 퐴’s payoff is (1− 훽¯푠0)휃¯Π+ 훽¯
푠
0(휃
퐴+ 휃퐶)푆. This upper
bound is attainable only when 퐴 observes whether 퐵푗 finds the prior art or not, and
in the case of discovery, 퐴 can grab the total reward 휃퐴 + 휃퐶 by racing faster than 퐵푗
to the patent office (or retaining someone to do that for her); and knowing that he can
never get the reward 휃퐶 , 퐵푗 ’s search intensity remains at 훽¯
푠
0. If any of these conditions
fail, 퐴’s payoff is strictly smaller than the upper bound. But since 휃퐴 + 휃퐶 ≤ 휃¯,22 the
ex post optimal mechanism cannot give a strictly higher return to the opportunistic
inventor than when (휃퐴, 휃퐶) = (0, 0). Put differently, if an opportunistic player wants
to apply for a patent after we introduce this (properly designed) challenge mechanism,
she probably has already done so under current system.23
□ Why not use monetary rewards? Given the necessity of extra challenge
incentives, we believe that patent rights is a more appealing reward instrument than
bounties, for it demands less information. To deter collusion, the patent authority
needs to have an idea of how serious the problem is, i.e., the size of 휆. On top of this,
in a bounty scheme, the amount of a monetary reward should also reflect the value of
the patented technology 푆, which is composed of both the market size (푁−1) and value
(휋) of the patented technology. Setting the bounty too low cannot deter collusion; too
high a bounty entails additional cost if it is financed by public funds. Also, limited
liability precludes bounties paid by the patent-holder, that is, a pecuniary punishment
to opportunistic patenting. A judgment-proof patent-holder is usually an individual
inventor or a small firm, or a ‘patent troll.’
22To see this, consider if the collusion-proof constraint is binding, 휆(휃¯−휃퐴) = 휃퐶 , then 휃¯ = 휃퐴+(휃퐶/휆) ≥
휃퐴 + 휃퐶 . If it’s not binding, then, referring to Figure 2, the optimal 휃퐴 = 0 and 휃퐶 ∈ (휆휃¯, 휃¯). Note that the
optimal 휃퐶 < 휃¯ for rewarding a challenger the whole patent rights, 휃¯, generates no ex post benefits upon all
other users, and in this case, 퐵푗 ’s search incentives will exceed the socially optimal level.
23When 휆 = 0, 퐴’s payoff is (1− 훽¯푠0)휃¯Π under current system, and may be improved to (1− 훽¯
푠
0)휃¯Π+ 훽¯
푠
0휃
퐶푆.
But, in a sense, this is because now 퐴 can ‘collude’ and arrange a third party to get the prize and transfer
the full prize 휃퐶 to her, contradictory to the presumption that no side transfer of monopoly profit is possible.
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□ How to measure 휆: Previous analysis shows that the extent of collusion 휆 is
critical in determining the optimal challenge mechanism. We may evaluate this param-
eter by considering the underlying market structure. For instance, when a potential
challenger competes with others in the product market, (partial) patent invalidation
will intensify competition and hurt the challenger. The latter would have stronger
incentives to collude. On the other hand, when there is spillover or positive network
effects of technology adoption that cannot be appropriated via patent rights, a poten-
tial challenger may have less incentive to collude with the patent-holder in order to
realize these benefits.24 Knowledge of market interactions helps determine the collusion
parameter 휆 and the construction of the optimal challenge policy.
Alternatively, the ex ante patent quality 훼 may also have an impact in collusion
incentives. In Appendix B, we present a sequential search case with two potential
challengers. Suppose that a reward is given only to the first challenger. The second
searcher will not search when the prior art has already been submitted. When observing
that no patent challenge has occurred, on the other hand, the second searcher’s decision
will be based on the belief that the patent is a bogus one, which in turn is affected by
the ex ante patent quality. Ceteris paribus, a lower patent quality means that it is more
likely to face a bogus patent and thus more likely to find the information. Foreseeing
the second searcher’s efforts, the first searcher who discovers the information will be
less willing to collude if the second searcher also finds the prior art and either shares
the monopoly gain or submits the information and spoils the collusive deal. Higher
search efforts from the second searcher, boosted by a lower patent quality, alleviates
collusion in the first stage.
As a by-product, another interesting result in this case is that an optimal collusion
may no require full collusion deterrence. Consider the collusion between the patent-
holder and the first challenger: If collusion is fully deterred, the second-searcher can
only attribute no challenge to the search failure in the first round, which implies a
lower probability of the existence of prior art. On the other hand, under a collusion
accommodation policy, lack of a challenge doesn’t convey this message and so preserves
search incentives. This effect may cause the failure of the collusion-proofness principle.
□ Concluding remarks: To implement the challenge mechanism proposed in this
paper will be no easy task. A proper reallocation of patent rights may require not only
24The two scenarios, we believe, correspond to the pharmaceutical and software industry, respectively.
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knowledge about collusion, but also a deep understanding of how patent rights are
exploited in different industries. Above we have discussed the potential relationship
between market competition and incentives to collude. Another channel through which
the technology feature would affect the optimal mechanism is the various possible
mappings from the technology space to product space. In this paper we’ve adopted a
very simple construction in that aspect, and one could easily think of other situations.
For instance, following the cumulative innovation literature (Green and Scotchmer,
1995), we may consider a setting where the challenger is himself a patent-holder, and so
may face a ‘counter-invalidation’ threat should he dare to initiate a challenge procedure.
Alternatively, we may also consider when the patent is not used ‘offensively’ (i.e., to
extract licensing payment or exclude competitors), but ‘defensively’ as bargaining chips
in licensing negotiations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). It would be useful and interesting
to see how challenge incentives should be shaped by policy in these contexts.
Appendix
A Proofs
□ Proposition 1
Proof. In the collusion-free case, the optimal 휃¯ = 휃∗ and 휃퐴 = 0. After a challenge,
there is no point to reward the patent-holder 퐴; and to encourage private search
the patent authority can do better by raising 휃퐶 instead of 휃¯. For 휃퐶 , notice that
the privately optimal search intensity 훽푠 satisfies (1 − 훼)(휃∗푣푒 + 휃퐶푆) ≡ 푐′(훽푠), with
∂훽푠/∂휃퐶 > 0. Social welfare is
풲 = 훼(푉 푒 − 휃∗퐷 −퐾) + (1− 훼)[(1 − 훽푠)(푉 푒 − 휃∗퐷) + 훽푠(푉 푒 − 휃퐶(푁 − 1)푑)] − 푐(훽푠)
⇒
푑풲
푑휃퐶
= (1− 훼)
(
− 훽푠(푁 − 1)푑+
{
휃∗[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋]− 휃퐶(푁 − 1)푣푒
} ∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
)
.
The optimal 휃퐶 > 0 if condition (2) holds at 휃퐶 = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
□ Lemma 1
Proof. A general side contract specifies that (i) 퐵푗 reports to 퐴 his value 푣푗 ∈ {푣
푙, 푣ℎ}
and promises not to challenge the patent; (ii) in return, 퐴 transfers to 퐵푗 a portion of
patent rights 휃˜푡−푗, 푡 ∈ {푙, ℎ}, again 퐵−푗; and (iii) 퐵푗 with value 푣
푡, 푡 ∈ {푙, ℎ}, can use
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the technology on his own production and generate a surplus (1 − 휃˜푡푗)푣
푡, and possibly
pays a fee 푓 푡 to 퐴. From the limited liability constraint and patent policy, 푓 푡 ≥ 0 and
휃˜푡−푗 ≤ 휃¯.
Let 퐴 offer the side contract {휃˜푡−푗 , 휃˜
푡
푗, 푓
푡}푡=ℎ,푙. The optimal side offer solves the
following program (suppose both types of 퐵푗 participate in the collusion)
(풮) : max 푈˜퐴 = 휌푓
ℎ + (1− 휌)푓 푙 + [휃¯ − 휌휃˜ℎ−푗 − (1− 휌)휃˜
푙
−푗 ]푆
푠.푡. (퐶퐼푅)푡푗 : 푈˜푖(푣
푡) = (1− 휃˜푡푗)푣
푡 − 푓 푡 + 휆휃˜푡−푗푆 ≥ 푣
푡 + 휃퐶푆, 푡 = ℎ, 푙
(퐼퐶)ℎ푗 : (1− 휃˜
ℎ
푗 )푣
ℎ − 푓ℎ + 휆휃˜ℎ−푗푆 ≥ (1− 휃˜
푙
푗)푣
ℎ − 푓 푙 + 휆휃˜푙−푗푆,
(퐼퐶)푙푗 : (1− 휃˜
푙
푗)푣
푙 − 푓 푙 + 휆휃˜푙−푗푆 ≥ (1− 휃˜
ℎ
푗 )푣
푙 − 푓ℎ + 휆휃˜ℎ−푗푆.
Assume 퐴 colludes if and only if collusive payoff is strictly larger than outside option:
푈˜퐴 > 휃
퐴푆. Define 휏 푡 ≡ 휆휃˜푡−푗푆 − 푓
푡 as the net transfer from 퐴 to 퐵, when 푣푗 = 푣
푡,
푡 ∈ {ℎ, 푙}. In order to induce participation, 휏 푡 ≥ 0. 퐴’s payoff can be written as
푈˜퐴 =
{
휃¯ − (1− 휆)[휌휃˜ℎ−푗 + (1− 휌)휃˜
푙
−푗]
}
푆 − [휌휏ℎ + (1− 휌)휏 푙].
From 휆 ≤ 1, side transfer of patent rights entails loss to 퐴. Therefore, given 휏 푡 ≥ 0,
if 푓 푡 > 0 and so 휃˜푡−푗 > 0, the patent-holder’s payoff can be increased by decreasing
both 푓 푡 and 휃˜푡−푗 while keeping 휏
푡 unchanged. In an optimal collusive offer, 퐵푗 pays no
licensing fee, 푓ℎ = 푓 푙 = 0.
Next, (퐶퐼푅) requires that (휆휃˜푡−푗 − 휃
퐶)푆 ≥ 휃˜푡푗푣
푡 ≥ 0, for both 푡, and so 휆휃˜푡−푗 ≥ 휃
퐶 .
But then, when Δ휃 ≤ 0, 퐴’s payoff from collusion is
푈˜퐴 = [휃¯ − 휌휃˜
ℎ
−푗 − (1− 휌)휃˜
푙
−푗 ]푆 ≤ (휃¯ −
휃퐶
휆
)푆 ≤ 휃퐴푆.
Collusion doesn’t take place in this case. On the other hand, if Δ휃 > 0, a feasible
collusive offer is 휆휃˜푡−푗 = 휃
퐶 , and 휃˜푡푗 = 0, for both 푡. This offer gives the patent-holder
a strictly higher payoff than no collusion. In fact, this is also the optimal side offer, for
any 휃˜푡푗 > 0 necessarily increases 휃˜
푡
−푗 in order to satisfy (퐶퐼푅)
푡
푗 , which is costly to 퐴.
There is no benefit to screen 푣푗 in this case. 퐵푗 gets a free license in a collusive offer.
퐴’s payoff at the optimal side offer is 푈˜ 푠퐴 = (휃¯ −
휃퐶
휆
)푆.
Finally, consider if 퐴 screens 푣푗 by partial collusion, i.e. to collude only with one
type of 퐵푗. Consider a side offer (휃˜−푗 , 휃˜푗) such that only one type’s participation is
satisfied (the same argument holds so that it is optimal to set 푓 = 0). First, it cannot
be the case that only 퐵푗 with high-value participates, for 푣
ℎ > 푣푙 contradicts with
partial collusion with high-value type, 휃˜푗푣
푙 > (휆휃˜−푗−휃
퐶)푆−푓 ≥ 휃˜푗푣
ℎ. And second, to
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partially collude with the low-value type, it requires 휃˜푗푣
ℎ > (휆휃˜−푗 − 휃
퐶)푆 − 푓 ≥ 휃˜푗푣
푙,
and so 휃˜푗 > 0 and 휆휃˜−푗 > 휃
퐶 . But from Δ휃 > 0 and 휆휃˜−푗 > 휃
퐶 , this is less profitable
than colluding with both types, 푈˜퐴 = [휌휃
퐴 + (1− 휌)(휃¯ − 휃˜−푗)]푆 < 푈˜
푠
퐴. 푄.퐸.퐷.
□ Lemma 2
Proof. Because an optimal collusive offer contains only a side transfer 휃˜−푗 ≥ 0 and 퐴
doesn’t screen 퐵푗’s type, the patent authority can and should incorporate the optimal
side contract into the patent policy in order to avoid the efficiency loss (1 − 휆)휃˜−푗푆.
Notice that, due to a binding participation constraint at the collusion subgame, 퐵푗’s
searching incentives are solely determined by the patent policy. 푄.퐸.퐷.
□ Proposition 2
Proof. The optimal 휃¯ = 휃∗ if 푁 and 훼 are large enough. For if not, when 푛 ≥ 3,
we can decrease 휃¯ by a small amount 휖 > 0 and increase 휃퐶 by 휖푣푒/푆 < 휖. The
search intensity is unchanged, and when 훼 > 2
푁+2 the social welfare is increased by
휖[훼퐷+ (1−훼)(1− 훽푠)퐷− (1−훼)훽푠(푁 − 1)푑푣
푒
푆
] > 0. Next, ignore (퐼퐶)퐴, and denote
the Lagrangian as ℒ푠, 퐹푂퐶s are
∂ℒ푠
∂휃퐴
= −(1− 훼)훽푠(푁 − 1)푑+ 휇휆, (5)
∂ℒ푠
∂휃퐶
= −(1− 훼)훽푠(푁 − 1)푑+ 휇+ (1− 훼)휓
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
, (6)
where 휓 ≡ (휃¯ − 휃퐴 − 휃퐶)(푁 − 1)푑 − [휃¯ + 휃퐶(푁 − 1)]휋. The assumption that 푐′′′ ≥ 0
ensures that ∂2훽푠/∂휃퐴2 ≤ 0 and thus the second-order condition will be satisfied.
Define the following terms: 훽푠휆 by (1−훼)(휃
∗푣푒+휆휃∗푆) ≡ 푐′(훽푠휆), 휓휆 ≡ (휃
∗−휆휃∗)(푁−
1)푑− [휃∗+휆휃∗(푁 − 1)]휋, 휙휆 ≡ 훽
푠
휆(푁 − 1)푑−휓휆
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
∣∣∣
훽푠
휆
, and Λ ≡ (1−휆)휙휆+휓휆
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
∣∣∣
훽푠
휆
.
Note that 훽푠휆 is increasing in 휆, while 휓휆 is decreasing in 휆, and so 휙휆 increasing in
휆. Also define 휆, 휆ˆ, and 휆¯ by 휙(휆) ≡ 0, 휓(휆ˆ) ≡ 0, and Λ(휆¯) ≡ 0, respectively. The
existence of 휆¯ is guaranteed by assuming 푁 large enough (more precisely, 푁 − 1 >
3휋푚2/푑2), so that Λ is strictly decreasing in 휆 over 휆 ≥ 휆ˆ; and 휆¯ > 휆ˆ. On the other
hand, 휆 may not exist. When exists, it satisfies 휆 < 휆ˆ < 휆¯.
With these definitions, when evaluating at 휃퐶 = 휆휃∗ and 휃퐴 = 0, 퐹푂퐶s are
∂ℒ푠
∂휃퐴
∣∣∣∣
휃퐶=휆휃∗,휃퐴=0
= −(1− 훼)(휙휆 + 휓휆
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
∣∣∣
훽푠
휆
) + 휇휆, (7)
∂ℒ푠
∂휃퐶
∣∣∣∣
휃퐶=휆휃∗,휃퐴=0
= −(1− 훼)휙휆 + 휇. (8)
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This policy is optimal if there exists 휇 ≥ 0 such that (7) is non-positive and (8) equals
to zero. The three regimes are
(i) 휆 ∈ [0, 휆), if 휆 exists: In this case, 휙휆 < 0, (8) is strictly positive, the optimal
휃퐶 > 휆휃∗. This in turn implies that (퐶푃 ) slacks and so 휇 = 0. From (5), the optimal
휃퐴 = 0.
(ii) 휆 ∈ [휆, 휆¯]: This regime can be further divided into two cases. For 휆 ∈ [휆, 휆ˆ], both
휙휆 and 휓휆 are non-negative. Let 휇 = (1 − 훼)휙휆 ≥ 0 and plug it into (7), which then
becomes non-positive. The policy 휃퐶 = 휆휃∗ and 휃퐴 = 0 is optimal. Suppose 휆 ∈ [휆ˆ, 휆¯]
and 휇 = (1− 훼)휙휆. Although 휓휆 ≤ 0 in this range, by Λ ≥ 0, (7) is still non-positive.
(iii) 휆 ∈ (휆¯, 1]: In this case, by Λ < 0, there exists no 휇 ≥ 0 such that (7) is non-positive
and (8) non-negative. And in any optimal 휇, condition (8) cannot be non-negative. For
this leads to 휇 > 0, and again by Λ < 0, (7) is also positive. (퐶푃 ) slacks, contradictory
to 휇 > 0. We then conclude that in optimum (7) must be strictly positive and (8)
strictly negative. The optimal policy satisfies 휃퐶 < 휆휃∗, 휃퐴 > 0, and (퐶푃 ) binding.
(To further derive the optimal 휃퐴, we can rewrite the program as a function of 휃퐴 only.
We omit it here.) Lastly, when 휆 = 1, for any distribution of 휃퐶 and 휃퐴 that makes
(퐶푃 ) binding, it must be 휓 < 0, and so condition (5) is strictly greater than (6). The
optimal 휃퐴 = 휃∗ and 휃퐶 = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
B Collusion and Patent Quality under Sequen-
tial Search
When multiple players engage in sequential search, a lower patent quality may alleviate
the collusion problem. It also provides an interesting case where the collusion-proof
principle may fail.25
Suppose that two players 퐻1 and 퐻2 search sequentially.
26 Let 퐻1 search first,
25Similar idea of using multiple auditors/supervisors to fight collusion can be found, among others, in
Laffont and Martimort (1999) and Khalil and Lawarre´e (2006). The latter study also endogenizes the collu-
sion efficiency parameter (휆) in a sequential supervision model, where tolerating early collusion is necessary
to motivate the second supervision. However, in their auditing model, the second supervisor (an external
auditor) is assumed not bribable and is appointed by the principal after the first supervisor (an internal
auditor) sending the auditing report. The external auditor is a costly ‘inspection device,’ but the principal’s
lack of commitment to using this device. When collusion between the agent and the internal auditor is fully
deterred, the principal loses incentives to hire the costly external auditor.
26We think this scenario captures some reality as it is difficult to imagine that all potential searchers
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and 퐻2 make a search decision after observing whether there is a patent challenge,
but not whether 퐻1 has found the information or whether 퐴 has colluded with 퐻1.
For simplicity, assume that 퐻1 and 퐻2 are not technology users and both are bribable
with 휆 = 1. They also have the same two-point search technology: 퐻푖 chooses search
intensity 훽푖 ∈ {0, 훽}, with 훽 ∈ (0, 1), and cost 푐(0) = 0 and 푐(훽) = 푐 > 0. Given the
existence of the prior art, the two’s search result are independent of each other and
cannot be observed by the other party.
Suppose 휃퐴 = 0 (see the discussion below). The patent authority announces a
policy (휃¯, 휃퐶), with the clause that 휃퐶 is rewarded only to the first challenger. Since
퐻푖 has no intrinsic interest in the technology, the challenge reward is worth 휃
퐶Π to
him. Let 퐴 keep the whole bargaining power at the collusion subgame. This reward
applies for both collusion and challenge paths.
퐻1 will incur the cost 푐 if and only if (1 − 훼)훽휃
퐶Π ≥ 푐, or, equivalently, 휃퐶 ≥
휃ˆ1 ≡
1
(1−훼)훽
푐
Π . By the announced policy, 퐻2 won’t search after 퐻1’s challenge. If no
challenge is observed, 퐻2’s search decision hinges on the belief whether 퐻1 colludes
with 퐴, which is in turn affected by the patent authority’s policy toward collusion.
Denote 푥 as the probability that 퐻1 colludes with 퐴. Observing no challenge from 퐻1,
퐻2 believes that the prior art exists with probability
(1− 훼)(1 − 훽1) + (1− 훼)훽1푥
훼+ (1− 훼)(1 − 훽1) + (1− 훼)훽1푥
=
(1− 훼)[1 − 훽1(1− 푥)]
1− (1− 훼)훽1(1− 푥)
,
which is decreasing in 훼 and increasing in 푥. 퐻2 searches, 훽2 = 훽, if and only if
(1− 훼)[1 − 훽1(1− 푥)]
1− (1− 훼)훽1(1− 푥)
훽휃퐶Π ≥ 푐 ⇒ 휃퐶 ≥ 휃ˆ푥2 ≡
1
(1− 훼)훽
1− (1− 훼)훽1(1− 푥)
1− 훽1(1− 푥)
푐
Π
.
Note that when 훽1 = 훽, 휃ˆ
0
2 > 휃ˆ
1
2 = 휃ˆ1. A policy that deters collusion between퐻1 and 퐴,
푥 = 0, raises the challenge reward needed to induce 퐻2’s search. Under such a policy,
퐻2 rationally interprets no challenge as a result of 퐻1’s search failure, which, given
훽1 = 훽, is in turn attributed to a higher 훼, i.e. the patent is more likely to be valid. By
contrast, if the policy allows collusion between 퐴 and 퐻1, then lack of a challenge from
퐻1 does not send a bad news about the existence of prior art. Assume that 휃¯ > 휃ˆ1 and
so, barring collusion, private search is useful to reduce ex post deadweight loss.
learn the granting of a patent at (roughly) the same time. Existing market competitors or professional
‘bounty hunters’ may observe closely the publication of patent issuance or applications. But new comers
may acquire through time the technology skill or knowledge that could be used in patent challenges, not to
mention professional researchers that learn about patent news from second-hand sources.
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Next, consider the policy toward collusion. We are mainly concerned with the case
where 퐻1 finds the information. Note that deterring collusion in all events requires
휃퐶 = 휃¯, since when 퐻1 fails we revert to the single-searcher case with 휆 = 1. This
policy also prevents collusion when 퐻1 finds the information, as 퐴 cannot offer a
higher bribe. Ignoring the event of the honest inventor, social welfare under this policy
is (1 − 훼)(푉 푒 − 휃¯퐷) − [1 + 훼 + (1 − 훼)(1 − 훽1)]푐. By 푥 = 0 and 휃¯ > 휃ˆ1, both 퐻1 and
퐻2 exert search intensity 훽, but 퐻2 searches only when there is no challenge from 퐻1.
In the current setting, the full collusion-deterrence policy is dominated by a case of no
private challenge, 휃퐶 < 휃ˆ1, which leads to social welfare (1− 훼)(푉
푒 − 휃¯퐷).27
When 휃퐶 ∈ (휃ˆ1, 휃¯), collusion occurs if 퐻2 alone finds the prior art. If 퐻1 finds and
brings the information to 퐴, their bargain is clouded by the possibility that 퐻2 finds
the information as well. In that case, either 퐻2 challenges the patent and spoils the
collusive deal between 퐻1 and 퐴, or 퐻2 also colludes with 퐴 and gets a share of 휃¯.
28
Let 훽푥2 be 퐻2’s search intensity given collusion probability 푥. The following lemma
describes the relationship between 휃퐶 and collusion outcomes.
Lemma 3. (Partial collusion deterrence). Consider 휃퐶 < 휃¯ and the subgame where 퐻1
has found the prior art.
When 휃퐶 < 휃¯/2, an equilibrium exists where 퐴 colludes with both 퐻1 and 퐻2 (upon
discovery); this is the unique equilibrium in the subgame when 0 < 휃퐶 <
1−훽1
2
2−훽1
2
휃¯.
When 휃퐶 ≥ 휃¯/2, 퐴 cannot collude with both searchers. And when 휃퐶 ≥
1−훽1
2
2−훽1
2
휃¯, an
equilibrium exists where there is no collusion between 퐴 and 퐻2. In addition, (i) if
휃퐶 < (1 − 훽12)휃¯, 퐴 colludes with 퐻1 with probability one; and (ii) if 휃
퐶 ≥ (1 − 훽02)휃¯,
there is no collusion between 퐻1 and 퐴.
Proof. A bribe of 휃퐶 is necessary to collude with 퐻2. For 퐻1, if he expects no challenge
from 퐻2, then he will accept 퐴’s side offer 휃
퐶 . Therefore when 휃퐶 < 휃¯/2, 퐴 can
collude with both searcher whatever 퐻1’s expectation. There is always an full collusion-
accommodation equilibrium. Even if 퐻1 expects 퐻2 to search and challenge the patent,
the maximal bribe he’ll ask is 휃퐶/(1 − 훽푥2 ), where 훽
푥
2 is 퐻2’s search intensity given
collusion probability 푥 between 퐻1 and 퐴. As long as 휃
퐶/(1 − 훽푥2 ) + 휃
퐶 < 휃¯, or
휃퐶 <
1−훽푥
2
2−훽푥
2
휃¯ < 휃¯/2, 퐴 can collude with both searchers.
27This hinges on the assumptions that 휆 = 1 and, again, that patent challenges provide no ex ante benefits.
28The assumption of an enforceable side contract prevents 퐻1 from running to the patent authority after
accepting a side offer. For 퐴, since she is protected by limited liability and 휃퐴 = 0, when 퐻2 challenges the
patent, 퐴 cannot pay the promised bribe.
26
Suppose that 휃퐶 ≥
1−훽1
2
2−훽1
2
휃¯ and퐻1 demands a large bribe 휃
퐶/(1−훽푥2 ), expecting퐻2’s
challenge probability 훽푥2 . Since 퐴’s maximal willingness to pay is 휃¯, (i) if 휃
퐶/(1−훽12 ) <
휃¯, there is collusion between 퐻1 and 퐴, and 퐻2 sets his search intensity at 훽
1
2 ; and (ii)
if 휃퐶/(1 − 훽02) ≥ 휃¯, there is no collusion between 퐻1 and 퐴, and 퐻2 sets his search
intensity at 훽02 .
Note that renegotiation is ignored. Once the side deal is reached, 퐻1 will insist
on the payment 퐴 has promised. This can be justified by assuming that only 퐴, but
not 퐻1, observes whether 퐻2 has found the information or not. This implies that 퐻1
receives no new information after signing the side contract, and so his outside option
remains the same in renegotiation. If 퐻1 agrees a lower payment after 퐻2 finds the
information, then 퐴 will send this request even when 퐻2 actually fails. 퐴 could simply
arrange someone else to pretend to be a searcher. This opportunistic behavior would
handicap renegotiation. 푄.퐸.퐷.
When
1−훽1
2
2−훽1
2
휃¯ ≤ 휃퐶 ≤ 휃¯/2 and so there are multiple equilibria in the collusion
subgame, we will focus on the partial deterrence equilibrium.29 Also, the fact that
휃퐶 < 휃¯ but 퐻2 challenges the patent implies collusion between 퐴 and 퐻1. However,
the patent authority cannot use this inference to punish 퐴 or 퐻1 because of limited
liability protection. In addition, the patent authority may not know the identity of
potential challengers unless they submit the information.
Due to a two-point search technology 훽2 ∈ {0, 훽}, it is necessary to induce 퐻2’s
search in order to deter collusion between 퐻1 and 퐴 while keeping 휃
퐶 < 휃¯. The chal-
lenge reward should then satisfy 휃퐶 ≥ max{(1−훽)휃¯, 휃ˆ02}. This gives us an expression of
collusion-proof constraint in the form of 휃퐶 ≥ (1− 휆ˆ)휃¯, where 휆ˆ is either equal to 훽 or
determined by 휃ˆ02. When 휃ˆ
0
2 > (1− 훽)휃¯, which is more likely to hold when 훽 increases,
a lower patent quality reduces the prize required to deter collusion between 퐻1 and 퐴,
for 휃ˆ02 increasing in 훼. Lower patent quality may alleviate the collusion problem.
Proposition 4. (Collusion and patent quality). Consider sequential search and the event
when 퐻1 has found the information. A lower patent quality may alleviate the collusion
problem between 퐻1 and 퐴: The lower bound of necessary reward to induce 푥 = 0,
max{(1− 훼)휃¯, 휃ˆ02}, is weakly increasing in 훼.
29The collusion accommodation equilibrium could be eliminated by introducing a non-bribable type of
퐻2. When there is small but positive probability that 퐻2 will challenge the patent, 퐻1 will demand a higher
bribe than 휃퐶 .
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To evaluate welfare effect for 휃퐶 ∈ (휃ˆ1, 휃¯), set 휃
퐶 = 휃퐶,0 = max{(1 − 훽)휃¯, 휃ˆ02}, and
so social welfare of deterring collusion between 퐻1 and 퐴 is
풲∣푥=0 = (1− 훼)
[
훽(푉 푒 − 휃퐶,0퐷) + (1− 훽)(푉 푒 − 휃¯퐷)
]
− [1 + 훼+ (1− 훼)(1 − 훽)]푐.
휃퐶,0 applies if and only if 퐻1 has found and submitted the information; 퐻2 then will
not search. But if 퐴 and 퐻1 is allowed to collude, 푥 = 1, by Lemma 3, the patent
authority only needs to set 휃퐶,1 = max{휃ˆ1,
1−훽
2−훽 휃¯}. By the same lemma, this policy is
feasible when 휃ˆ1 < (1− 훽)휃¯.
30 Social welfare under this policy is
풲∣푥=1 = (1− 훼)
[
훽2(푉 푒 − 휃퐶,1퐷) + (1− 훽2)(푉 푒 − 휃¯퐷)
]
− 2푐.
The policy 휃퐶,1 applies when 퐻1 and 퐻2 find the information, for 퐴 cannot collude
with both. 퐻2 will incur 푐 for sure because 퐻1 will not challenge the patent.
Compare the two policies:
풲∣푥=1 −풲∣푥=0 = (1− 훼)
[
훽휃퐶,0 + (1− 훽)휃¯ − 훽2휃퐶,1 − (1− 훽2)휃¯
]
퐷 − (1− 훼)훽푐
= (1− 훼)훽
{
[휃퐶,0 − 훽휃퐶,1 − (1− 훽)휃¯]퐷 − 푐
}
. (9)
Relative to preventing 퐴 from colluding with 퐻1, partial collusion accommodation
improves social welfare by requiring a lower challenge reward 휃퐶,1 ≤ 휃퐶,0, at a cost of
more frequent search from 퐻2, who also searches when 퐻1 has found the information
but colludes with 퐴. The welfare difference, expression (9), can’t be positive if 휃퐶,0 =
(1 − 훽)휃¯ ≥ 휃ˆ02. On the other hand, we can have 풲∣푥=1 > 풲푥=0 whether 휃ˆ1 ≷
1−훽
2−훽 휃¯.
The following proposition gives specific conditions if 휃¯ = 휃∗. As can be shown, 푥 = 0
is more likely to be optimal when 훽 is larger.31
Proposition 5. (Failure of collusion-proofness principle). The collusion-proofness prin-
ciple may not hold in the sequential search case. It is optimal to accommodate collu-
sion between 퐻1 and 퐴, 풲∣푥=1 > 풲∣푥=0, which is possible only if 휃ˆ
0
2 > (1− 훽)휃¯, i.e.,
휃퐶,0 = 휃ˆ02.
30When 푥 = 1, 휃ˆ12 = 휃ˆ1 and so 훽2 = 훽 if 퐻1 searches.
31For completeness, we also compare the partial-accommodation policy 휃퐶,1 with the full-accommodation
policy 휃퐶 = 0:
풲∣푥=1 − (1− 훼)(푉
푒 − 휃¯퐷) = (1 − 훼)훽2(휃¯ − 휃퐶,1)퐷 − 2푐 =
{
(1− 훼) 훽
2
2−훽
푑
휋
퐾 − 2푐 푖푓 휃ˆ1 <
1−훽
2−훽
휃¯
(1− 훼)훽2 푑
휋
퐾 − (2 + 훽 푑
휋
)푐 푖푓 휃ˆ1 >
1−훽
2−훽
휃¯,
at 휃¯ = 휃∗. Again, both are more likely to be positive when 훽 is larger.
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Furthermore, if 휃¯ = 휃∗, then condition (9) is strictly positive if:
(i) for 휃ˆ1 >
1−훽
2−훽 휃¯ and so 휃
퐶,1 = 휃ˆ1,
[
(1− 훽)2 + 훼훽
(1− 훼)훽(1 − 훽)
푑
휋
− 1
]
푐 > (1− 훽)
푑
휋
퐾,
subject to max{ (1−훼)훽(1−훽)2−훽 퐾,
(1−훼)훽(1−훽)2
1−훽(1−훼) 퐾} < 푐 < (1− 훼)훽(1 − 훽)퐾; and
(ii) for 휃퐶,1 = 1−훽2−훽 휃¯ > 휃ˆ1,[
1− 훽(1− 훼)
(1− 훼)훽(1 − 훽)
푑
휋
− 1
]
푐 >
2(1 − 훽)
2− 훽
푑
휋
퐾,
subject to (1−훼)훽(1−훽)
2
1−훽(1−훼) 퐾 < 푐 <
(1−훼)훽(1−훽)
2−훽 퐾.
Proof. Case (i) requires 1−훽2−훽 휃¯ < 휃ˆ1 < (1 − 훽)휃¯ < 휃ˆ
0
2 < 휃¯, and case (ii) requires
휃ˆ1 <
1−훽
2−훽 휃¯ < (1 − 훽)휃¯ < 휃ˆ
0
2 < 휃¯. We can obtain these results by inserting 휃¯ =
휃∗ = 퐾/Π, 휃퐶,0 = 휃ˆ02 =
1−훽(1−훼)
1−훽 휃ˆ1, and 휃ˆ1 =
1
(1−훼)훽
푐
Π into condition (9) and these
requirements. 푄.퐸.퐷.
Remark 1. (Optimality of 휃퐴 = 0). Previous analysis shows that 휃퐴 > 0 only to dilute
search incentives. With a binary search decision, a higher reward won’t induce more
search once the threshold 휃ˆ푖 is passed. Also note that a strictly positive 휃
퐴 facilitates
collusion, for 퐴 can use this to pay the bribe to 퐻1 even after 퐻2 challenges the patent.
∥
Remark 2. (Rationally ignorant patent office). The positive relationship between
patent quality and the extent of collusion has an interesting implication for the role
of the patent office in the patent-granting process, which has been abstracted in this
paper. While the patent quality can be improved with more resources injected in the
patent office and better performance by patent examiners, it comes at a cost of aggra-
vating post-issuance collusion. This may provide another support of Lemley (2006)’s
‘rationally ignorant’ patent office. ∥
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C Ex Post Analysis of the Single-User Case (Not
for publication)
In this appendix, we consider the special case of 푁 = 1.32 Suppose that the unique
user of patented technology 퐵 values the technology at 푣 ∈ {푣ℎ, 푣푙} and has the search
ability. The patent protection thus is exercised against 퐵. To slightly abuse the
notation, a patent policy consists of two elements Θ = (휃¯, 휃퐴): 퐴 is granted 휃¯ ≥ 휃∗
when there is no patent challenge, and 휃퐴 otherwise. Intuitively, the optimal policy
should satisfy 휃¯ ≥ 휃퐴.33 Collusion is not an issue here; the patent authority needs only
to deal with inadequate private incentives to search.
An interesting result in this special case is that any policy satisfying 휃¯ > 휃퐴 leads
to over-search, including the ex post efficient policy Θ∗ ≡ (휃∗, 0), where the inventor’s
innovation incentive is satisfied and the patent is entirely invalidated after prior art
submission. The see the discrepancy between private and social incentives to search,
let’s keep the timing that 퐵 chooses the search intensity 훽 before learning 푣. Given a
policy Θ = (휃¯, 휃퐴), 퐵’s challenge benefit is the production surplus over the narrowed
patent right 휃¯ − 휃퐴. The privately optimal search intensity 훽ˆ is determined by
훽ˆ = argmax
훽
(1− 훼)훽(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣푒 − 푐(훽) ⇒ 퐹푂퐶 : (1− 훼)(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣푒 ≡ 푐′(훽ˆ). (10)
On the other hand, society benefits from the reduction of deadweight loss associated
with monopoly pricing. The socially optimal search intensity 훽∗ is determined by
훽∗ = argmax
훽
(1− 훼)훽(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푑− 푐(훽) ⇒ 퐹푂퐶 : (1− 훼)(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푑 ≡ 푐′(훽∗). (11)
Since 푣푒 > 푑, private incentives to search are greater than social incentives; there is
over-search, 훽ˆ > 훽∗.
□ Patent policy: Taking search incentives into account, the ex post optimal policy
solves
max
휃¯,휃퐴
훼(푣푒 − 휃¯푑−퐾) + (1− 훼)[푣푒 − 훽ˆ휃퐴푑− (1− 훽ˆ)휃¯푑]− 푐(훽ˆ)
푠.푡. 휃¯ ≥ 휃∗ and 푐′(훽ˆ) ≡ (1− 훼)(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣푒
32 To motivate this case, consider a patented product. Patent-holder 퐴 lacks commercialization capacity
and must license patent rights to an incumbent 퐵. There may be potential entrants, but assume that
a positive entry fee and fierce competition (e.g. Bertrand competition) drive post-entry profit to zero.
Alternatively, there may be barriers to entry other than IPRs. When 퐵 acts as the sole manufacturer, the
private information 푣 may be a market demand or production cost parameter.
33Otherwise it is 퐴, not 퐵, who would search in order to find the information and expand patent protection.
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Figure 3: Timing with informed search
The optimal 휃¯ = 휃∗: Raising patent protection under no challenge above 휃∗ only creates
more deadweight loss and induces higher search intensity, which already exceeds the
socially optimal level. More interestingly, the optimal 휃퐴 may be greater than zero,
because doing so would discourage private search. The optimal 휃퐴 > 0 if and only if
훽ˆ is sufficiently sensitive to the policy adjustment. The following proposition provides
the exact condition.
Proposition 6. When the challenger is the unique technology user, private incentives
cause over-search. The optimal 휃¯ = 휃∗. It is optimal to set 휃퐴 > 0 if and only if
(휃¯ − 휃퐴)
훽ˆ
∂훽ˆ
∂(휃¯ − 휃퐴)
∣∣∣
Θ∗
>
푑
휋
. (12)
Proof. The optimality of 휃¯ = 휃∗ is trivial. Condition (12) comes from a positive first-
order condition when evaluated at Θ∗:
−(1− 훼)훽ˆ(Θ∗)푑− (1− 훼)휋휃∗
∂훽ˆ
∂휃퐴
∣∣∣
Θ∗
= −(1− 훼)훽ˆ(Θ∗)푑
(
1 +
휋
푑
휃∗
훽ˆ
∂훽ˆ
∂휃퐴
∣∣∣
Θ∗
)
.
푄.퐸.퐷.
□ Signaling effect of private search: Alternatively, the signaling effect of a
patent challenge may discourage private search. Consider a situation where 퐵 learns
the true value 푣 before engaging in information search. Referring to Figure 1, we shall
call this scenario “informed search” (search at time 2.5) and the case we considered
in the main text “uninformed search” (search at time 1.5). Under informed search,
different values 푣푡 may lead to different intensities 훽푡, 푡 ∈ {ℎ, 푙}. Even if 퐴 cannot
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observe the search intensity,34 as long as 훽ℎ ∕= 훽푙, an opportunistic inventor acquires
new information about 푣 from the search outcome.35
For instance, when 훽푙 << 훽ℎ ≃ 1, the opportunistic patent-holder infers no chal-
lenge and so search failure from low search intensity due to low value 푣푙, i.e., the lack
of a challenge signifies low value; she accordingly lowers the licensing fee to 푣푙. The
user with high value 푣ℎ, then, has an incentive to lower his search intensity in order to
capitalize on this signaling effect and realize surplus 푣ℎ − 푣푙.
Define 휌¯ ≡ 푣
푙
푣ℎ
. 퐴’s optimal pricing strategy is 푣ℎ (푣푙) when she holds belief 푃푟(푣ℎ) ≥
휌¯ (푃푟(푣ℎ) < 휌¯, respectively). Given Θ, define 훽ˆ푡, 푡 ∈ {ℎ, 푙}, such that
(1− 훼)(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣푡 ≡ 푐′(훽ˆ푡). (13)
훽ˆ푡 is the privately optimal search level under the licensing fee 푣ℎ. The following lemma
gives the shape of equilibria in this game (see the proof for the full characterization).
Lemma 4. Consider the single-user, informed search case. When 퐴 observes only the
search outcome, but not the intensity, there is no equilibrium in which both types of
user 퐵 choose the same intensity. And
ℰ1: In the unique pure strategy equilibrium, if it exists, 퐵 with value 푣푡 chooses equi-
librium intensity 훽ˆ푡, 푡 = ℎ, 푙, and 퐴 always offers a licensing fee 푣ℎ. This equilibrium
exists if and only if
휌(1− 훽ˆℎ)
휌(1− 훽ˆℎ) + (1− 휌)(1 − 훽ˆ푙)
≥ 휌¯; (14)
ℰ2: If condition (14) fails, an equilibrium exists where
∙ 퐵 with 푣푙 still chooses 훽ˆ푙; and 퐵 with 푣ℎ lowers his search intensity to some
level in the open interval (훽ˆ푙, 훽ˆℎ);
∙ the honest 퐴 always offers a licensing fee 푣ℎ. The opportunistic 퐴 offers a
licensing fee 푣ℎ if there is a patent challenge; otherwise, she randomizes between
the two offers 푣ℎ and 푣푙, with a belief 휌¯.
Proof. A low-value type user always gets zero surplus over 휃¯ and 휃퐴, whatever the
patent-holder’s pricing strategy. His equilibrium search intensity 훽ˆ푙 is determined
34This may not always be the case. Suppose, for instance, that 퐵 has no ability to search, but can post a
bounty on BountyQuest’s website (see Section 1). 퐵 then influences the search intensity via the amount of
bounty. By design this amount is public information.
35There is no such learning for the honest inventor, since no prior art can be found whatever the intensity.
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according to (13). Given (훽ℎ, 훽ˆ푙), denote the updated belief as 휌∅ (휌푝) when nothing
is found (the prior art is found, respectively), with
휌∅ =
휌(1− 훽ℎ)
휌(1− 훽ℎ) + (1− 휌)(1 − 훽ˆ푙)
and 휌푝 =
휌훽ℎ
휌훽ℎ + (1− 휌)훽ˆ푙
.
Consider first the pure strategy equilibrium.
⋄ Suppose 훽ℎ = 훽ˆ푙 in equilibrium, then search result reveals no new information,
휌∅ = 휌푝 = 휌. The opportunistic inventor charges 푣
ℎ whether there is challenge or not.
The high-value type user gets
휋ℎ퐵 = 훼(1 − 휃¯)푣
ℎ + (1− 훼)[훽ℎ(1− 휃퐴)푣ℎ + (1− 훽ℎ)(1− 휃¯)푣ℎ]− 푐(훽ℎ)
⇒
∂휋ℎ퐵
∂훽ℎ
∣∣∣
훽ℎ=훽ˆ푙
= (1− 훼)(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣ℎ − 푐′(훽ˆ푙) > 0.
He will deviate to a higher level of search intensity; this can’t be an equilibrium.
⋄ For an equilibrium with different intensities, first note that 훽ˆℎ > 훽ˆ푙 in any equilib-
rium; otherwise, 휌∅ > 휌 ≥ 휌¯ along the equilibrium path, while 휌푝 ≷ 휌¯. Monopoly price
remains at 푣ℎ if no challenge. When there is a challenge, the lower bound of the high-
value user’s surplus is (1 − 휃퐴)푣ℎ. But then the equilibrium 훽ˆℎ > 훽ˆ푙, a contradiction,
for the minimal equilibrium intensity solves
max
훽ℎ
(1− 훼)
{
훽ℎ[휃퐴 ⋅ 0 + (1− 휃퐴)푣ℎ] + (1− 훽ℎ)(1− 휃¯)푣ℎ
}
− 푐(훽ℎ).
From 훽ˆℎ > 훽ˆ푙, along the equilibrium path, beliefs are such that 휌푝 > 휌 > 휌∅ and
휌푝 > 휌¯. The optimal pricing when the prior art is found is 푣
ℎ. Depending on 휌∅ ≷ 휌¯ :
(푖) if 휌∅ < 휌¯, the opportunistic inventor sets the licensing fee at 푣
푙 over 휃퐴, but
then the high-value user’s optimal search intensity solves
max
훽ℎ
(1− 훼){훽ℎ(1− 휃퐴)푣ℎ + (1− 훽ℎ)[휃¯Δ푣 + (1− 휃¯)푣ℎ]} − 푐(훽ℎ)
⇒ 퐹푂퐶 : (1− 훼)[(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣ℎ − 휃¯Δ푣] ≡ 푐′(훽ˆℎ).
This leads to a contradiction as (휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣ℎ − 휃¯Δ푣 ≤ (휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣푙, where Δ푣 ≡ 푣ℎ − 푣푙.
(푖푖) if 휌∅ ≥ 휌¯, the opportunistic inventor sets the licensing fee at 푣
ℎ over 휃퐴, the
optimal search intensity is determined by (1−훼)(휃¯− 휃퐴)푣ℎ ≡ 푐′(훽ˆℎ). For this to be an
equilibrium, 훽ˆℎ cannot be too large. The necessary and sufficient condition of existence
is 휌∅(훽ˆ
푡) ≥ 휌¯, i.e. condition (14).
⋄ If condition (14) fails, there is no pure equilibrium. An equilibrium exists such that
the honest inventor always offers a licensing fee 푣ℎ; the opportunistic inventor offers a
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licensing fee 푣ℎ in the case of patent challenge, and she randomizes the price by offering
푣푙 with probability 푦 ∈ (0, 1) when no challenge; and the low-value user always chooses
훽ˆ푙 while the high-value user chooses 훽ℎ푦 ∈ (훽ˆ
푙, 훽ˆℎ). The equilibrium 푦 and 훽ℎ푦 satisfy
휌(1− 훽ℎ푦 )
휌(1− 훽ℎ푦 ) + (1− 휌)(1− 훽ˆ
푙)
= 휌¯ and (1− 훼)[(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣ℎ − 푦휃¯Δ푣] ≡ 푐′(훽ℎ푦 ).
The existence and uniqueness of 훽ℎ푦 ∈ (훽ˆ
푙, 훽ˆℎ) is guaranteed by the failure of condition
(14). Once 훽ℎ푦 is fixed, a unique 푦 ∈ (0, 1) can be found. 푄.퐸.퐷.
In ℰ2, the user learns perfectly that 퐴 is opportunistic by observing the price offer
푣푙. For simplicity, we assume away any search opportunity after this learning and the
elicitation of this information by the patent authority.36
In the pure strategy equilibrium ℰ1, the licensing fee is fixed at 푣ℎ. Prior art
submission narrows patent protection from 휃¯ to 휃퐴, but social welfare increases only
when 푣 = 푣푙. Put differently, given this pricing strategy and search intensity, when
the value of the technology increases from 푣푙 to 푣ℎ, private search benefit is raised
from (1 − 훼)훽(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣푙 to (1 − 훼)훽(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣ℎ, but social benefit is reduced from
(1 − 훼)훽(휃¯ − 휃퐴)푣푙 to zero. An increase in the technology value causes the privately
and socially optimal search intensity to adjust along opposite directions.
Equilibrium ℰ2 exists when condition (14) fails. This is the case when 훽ˆℎ is large, i.e.
a high-value user searches so intensively that, in case of search failure, the opportunistic
inventor suspects that she most likely faces a low-value user and therefore reduces the
licensing fee. The ‘no challenge’ signal, then, confers benefit on the high-value user
and thus justifies lower search intensity.37
Relative to ℰ1, private behavior in equilibrium ℰ2 is more ‘social friendly’ because
the high-value user reduces his search intensity (although still exceeds the social optimal
level), and the opportunistic inventor lowers the licensing fee with some probability.
Proposition 7. (Signaling). The private behavior in equilibrium ℰ2 is more in line with
social interests in terms of reduced search and the probability of a lower licensing fee.
36Otherwise, the opportunistic inventor would prefer to mimic the honest type and refrain from offering
푣푙. This is socially costly.
37In this equilibrium, the high-value user still submits after discovery, for (1−휃퐴)푣ℎ > 푦(푣ℎ−푣푙)+(1−휃¯)푣ℎ,
where 푦 is the probability that the opportunistic inventor offers 푣푙 when there is no challenge.
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Remark. (BountyQuest revisited). Besides the standard free rider argument, the sig-
naling effect described here may help explain the failure of BountyQuest (Section 1).38
Nevertheless, Proposition 7 also suggests that this failure could be welfare-enhancing
in some cases. ∥
Remark. (Signaling from the patent-holder). Signaling may also appear on the patent-
holder side. If we alter the timing of the game so that the licensing stage comes before
the search stage, an opportunistic patent-holder may be tempted to charge a lower
fee in order to reduce search intensity. But since no honest inventor would do this,
this offer reveals the patent-holder’s true type and may backfire by restoring search
incentives. ∥
D Simultaneous search and the collusion-proof
mechanism (Not for publication)
This appendix considers how the optimal mechanism characterized in Proposition 2
should be modified if two users search simultaneously. Assume that the two user-
searchers make the search decision simultaneously with a common cost 푐(⋅). For sim-
plicity, let the search results be realized independently, and the number of users be
large enough. To be comparable with section 3, we assume that when one searcher has
found the prior art, he observes whether the other has also found it. The only friction
in collusion therefore is the loss in transfer 1− 휆.39
For simplicity, keep the policy restriction to exempt a user from licensing obligation
when he submits the prior art. A policy is still a triplet (휃¯, 휃퐴, 휃퐶), but now 휃퐶 is
assumed shared equally if both searchers submit the information.40 The collusion-
proofness principle holds, with the same (퐶푃 ), although the collusion gains reduces
to a proportion of (푁 − 2)휋 when both have found the information. We first look for
38According to the company rule, the identity of both bounty posters and hunters are kept secret and
submitted information is disclosed only to the poster. This should reduce free riding.
39Otherwise, if only 퐴 observes how many users have found the information, she has incentives to claim
that both have found it in order to reduce the collusive offer when, in fact, only one has found the information.
Knowing this, the searcher won’t accept such an offer and so collusion may breakdown even when there are
gains from doing so.
40We use a “no arbitrage” argument to justify the implicit assumption that the patent rights allocation
after challenge cannot depend on the number of challengers. Suppose, say, 휃퐶 is higher when there are two
challengers. If only one has found the prior art, the unique searcher can reveal the information to any third
party and realize the higher payoff. By the same toke, 휃퐴 is independent of the number of challengers.
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the symmetric equilibrium in search intensity, denoted as 훽푚. Given the other chooses
훽푚, a searcher’s optimal intensity is determined by
max
훽˜
(1− 훼)
{
훽푚훽˜[푣푒 +
휃퐶
2
(푁 − 2)휋] + (1− 훽푚)훽˜(푣푒 + 휃퐶푆)
+ 훽푚(1− 훽˜)(1− 휃퐶)푣푒 + (1− 훽푚)(1− 훽˜)(1 − 휃¯)푣푒
}
− 푐(훽˜)
⇒ 푐′(훽푚) ≡ (1− 훼)
{
푣푒[휃¯ − 훽푚(휃¯ − 휃퐶)] + 휃퐶(푆 − 훽푚
Π
2
)
}
.
It is easy to see that, under the same policy, 훽푚 < 훽푠. The presence of the other
searcher reduces one’s search incentives because of the sharing of the prize when both
have found the information and free-riding, i.e. when 휃퐶 < 휃¯, one can profit from a
lower patent power due to the other’s search. The policy’s incentive effect to boost
search is also weaker. When measured at the same policy and 훽,
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
=
(1− 훼)푆
푐′′
>
(1− 훼)
푐′′
[푆 − 훽(
Π
2
− 푣푒)] >
∂훽푚
∂휃퐶
.
The patent authority’s optimization program is
(풫)푚 : max
휃¯,휃퐴,휃퐶
풲푚 = 훼(푉 푒 − 휃¯퐷 −퐾) + (1− 훼)
[
푉 푒 − (1− 훽푚)2휃¯퐷
− 2훽푚(1− 훽푚)(휃퐴 + 휃퐶)(푁 − 1)푑 − 훽푚2(휃퐴 + 휃퐶)(푁 − 2)푑
]
− 2푐(훽푚)
푠.푡. (퐼퐶)퐴 : 휃¯ ≥ 휃
∗, (퐶푃 ) : Δ휃 ≤ 0,
(퐼퐶)푐 : 푐
′(훽푚) ≡ (1− 훼)
{
푣푒[휃¯ − 훽푚(휃¯ − 휃퐶)] + 휃퐶(푆 − 훽푚
Π
2
)
}
.
Besides the difference in search intensity, multiple-search also slightly reduces the social
loss of the challenge reward when both have found the information to (푁 − 2)푑. The
optimal policy still takes the shape of three regimes: only when suboptimal private
incentives to search become a serious concern will the optimal policy depart from the
lest costly way to deter collusion, 휃퐶 = 휆휃∗.41 But the ranges of the three regimes
may be affected. For instance, consider a very small 휆 so that collusion is not the
dominant concern. Although free riding lowers private incentives to search, and so the
patent authority is more willing to give additional reward, a smaller incentive effect
of policy (∂훽푚/∂휃퐶 < ∂훽푠/∂휃퐶) also makes it more costly to restore search intensity.
This trade-off may expand or shrink regime (i), relative to the previous case. Similar
reasoning holds at the high end of 휆, where duplication of search cost worsens the
over-search problem.
41Large 푁 and 훼 guarantee the optimality of 휃¯ = 휃∗ for similar argument in the proof of Proposition 2.
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As an example, suppose 푐(훽) = 퐶훽2/2 and 푁 →∞.42 The next proposition shows
that, relative to the single search case, in simultaneously multiple-search regime (i)
shrinks while regime (iii) may or may not expand.
Proposition 8. Suppose 푐(훽) = 퐶훽2/2 and 푁 → ∞. When there are two searchers
(program (풫)푚), relative to the case where only one users searches (program (풫)푠),
regime (i) shrinks; and regime (iii) expands when 휋2 ≤ 3푑2, or when 휋2 > 3푑2 but 휋
and 퐶 are not too large.
Proof. Suppose 푐(훽) = 퐶2 훽
2, with 퐶 > 0. When evaluated at 휃¯ = 휃∗, optimal private
search intensities and the policy 휃퐶 ’s incentive effects are
훽푠 =
1− 훼
퐶
(휃∗푣푒 + 휃퐶푆) > 훽푚 =
퐶
퐶 +Δ
훽푠, and
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
=
(1− 훼)푆
퐶
>
∂훽푚
∂휃퐶
=
퐶
퐶 +Δ
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
퐶
(퐶 +Δ)2
훽푠
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
> 0,
where Δ = (1−훼)[(휃∗− 휃퐶)푣푒+ 휃퐶 Π2 ]. To consider the limiting case 푁 →∞, we let 퐶
be proportional to 푁 in order to constrain 훽푠 below one. Solving 휆 and 휆¯ in the proof
of Proposition 2, as 푁 →∞,
휆 =
푁휋푑− (휋 + 푑)2
(푁 − 1)휋(휋 + 2푑)
→
푑
휋 + 2푑
and 휆¯→
2푑
휋 + 2푑
,
for 휆¯ is the positive root of
휆2(휋 + 2푑)휋(푁 − 1)− 휆[2휋푑(푁 − 1)− 휋2 − (휋 + 푑)푑] − (휋 + 푑)푑 = 0.
Since a reward of 휃퐶 = 휆휃∗ stops at 휆¯, to ensure 훽푠 < 1 when 푁 →∞, we require
훽푠 =
(1− 훼)휃∗
퐶
[푣푒 + 휆¯푆] < 1⇒ 퐶 > (1− 훼)휃∗
(휋 + 2푑)휋
2푑
푁.
(i). To show that regime (i) shrinks, denote the Lagrangian of program (풫)푚 as ℒ푚,
and the multiplier of (퐶푃 ) as 휇. When evaluating at 휃퐴 = 0 and 휃퐶 = 휆휃¯ = 휆휃∗, the
FOC with respect to 휃퐶 is
∂ℒ푚
∂휃퐶
= −(1− 훼)
{
2[훽푚(푁 − 1)푑− 휓휆
∂훽푚
∂휃퐶
]− 훽푚2퐷
+2휃∗훽푚[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑 +
휋
2
)]
∂훽푚
∂휃퐶
}
+ 휇
= −(1− 훼){
2퐶
퐶 +Δ
[훽푠(푁 − 1)푑− 휓휆
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
] +
2퐶훽푠휓휆
(퐶 +Δ)2
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
− (
퐶
퐶 +Δ
훽푠)2퐷
+2휃∗(
퐶
퐶 +Δ
)2훽푠[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑+
휋
2
)][
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
훽푠
퐶 +Δ
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
]}+ 휇,
42To keep 훽푠 < 1, we let 퐶 be proportional to 푁 . See the proof.
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where 휓휆 is as defined in the proof of Proposition 2. At 휆, by definition, 훽
푠(푁 − 1)푑 ≡
휓휆(∂훽
푠/∂휃퐶). The sign of ∂ℒ
푚
∂휃퐶
is determined by
−
2퐶훽푠휓휆
(퐶 +Δ)2
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
+ (
퐶
퐶 +Δ
훽푠)2퐷
−2휃∗(
퐶
퐶 +Δ
)2훽푠[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑+
휋
2
)][
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
훽푠
퐶 +Δ
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
]
=
퐶훽푠
(퐶 +Δ)2
{−2휓휆
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
+ 퐶훽푠퐷 − 2휃∗퐶[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑+
휋
2
)][
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
훽푠
퐶 +Δ
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
]}.
As 푁 →∞,
(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑 +
휋
2
)→
푁
2
푑− 휋, Δ→
(1− 훼)휃∗
휋 + 2푑
[(휋 + 푑)2 + 휋푑
푁
2
],
2휓휆
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
=
훽푠(푁 − 1)푑
∂훽푠/∂휃퐶
(1− 훼)(Π− 푣푒)→ (1− 훼)휃∗(휋 + 2푑)(휋 + 푑)(푁 −
푣푒
휋
),
퐶훽푠퐷 → (1− 훼)휃∗[푣푒 +
푑
휋 + 2푑
(푁 − 1)휋]푁푑, and
2휃∗퐶[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑+
휋
2
)][
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
훽푠
퐶 +Δ
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
]
→ (1− 훼)휃∗(푁푑− 2휋)
{
(푁 − 1)휋 − (
푁휋
2
− 푣푒)
(1− 훼)휃∗[(휋 + 2푑)푣푒 + (푁 − 1)휋푑]
(휋 + 2푑)퐶 + (1− 훼)휃∗[(휋 + 푑)2 + 푁2 휋푑]
}
.
For 푁 sufficiently large, the comparison is dominated by 푁2. Collecting relevant terms
(and ignore (1− 훼)휃∗),
휋푑2
휋 + 2푑
푁(푁 − 1)−푁푑
{
(푁 − 1)휋 −
푁
2
휋
(1− 훼)휃∗[(휋 + 2푑)푣푒 + (푁 − 1)휋푑]
(휋 + 2푑)퐶 + (1− 훼)휃∗[(휋 + 푑)2 + 푁2 휋푑]
}
< 푁휋푑
{
−
휋 + 푑
휋 + 2푑
(푁 − 1) +
푁
2
(휋 + 2푑)푣푒 + (푁 − 1)휋푑
(휋+2푑)2휋
2푑 푁 + (휋 + 푑)
2 + 휋푑2 푁
}
→ 푁휋푑
[
−
휋 + 푑
휋 + 2푑
(푁 − 1) +
푑2
(휋 + 2푑)2 + 푑2
푁
]
< 0.
Therefore, for 푁 large enough, regime (i) shrinks when there are two searchers.
(ii). To show that regime (iii) may expand, by the same token, at 휆¯, by ∂ℒ푚/∂휃퐶 = 0,
the FOC with respect to 휃퐴 is
∂ℒ푚
∂휃퐴
= −(1− 훼)
{
2[(1 − 휆)훽푚(푁 − 1)푑+ 휆휓휆
∂훽푚
∂휃퐶
]
−(1− 휆)훽푚2퐷 − 2휆휃∗훽푚[(푁 − 1)푑 − 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑 +
휋
2
)]
∂훽푚
∂휃퐶
}
= −(1− 훼)
{ 2퐶
퐶 +Δ
[(1− 휆)훽푠(푁 − 1)푑+ 휆휓휆
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
]− 휆휓휆
2퐶훽푠
(퐶 +Δ)2
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
− (1− 휆)(
퐶훽푠
퐶 +Δ
)2퐷
−2휆휃∗(
퐶
퐶 +Δ
)2훽푠[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑+
휋
2
)][
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
훽푠
퐶 +Δ
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
]
}
,
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where (1−휆)훽푠(푁 − 1)푑 ≡ −휆휓휆(∂훽
푠/∂휃퐶) at 휆¯. When evaluated at 휆¯ and 휃퐶 = 휆¯휃∗,
the sign of FOC is determined by
2휆휓휆
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
+ (1− 휆)퐶훽푠퐷 + 2휆휃∗퐶[(푁 − 1)푑− 휋 − 휆(푁 − 2)(푑 +
휋
2
)][
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
훽푠
퐶 +Δ
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
]
= (1− 훼)휆휓휆(푁휋 − 푣
푒) + (1− 휆)퐶훽푠푁푑+ 2휆퐶[휓휆 + 휆휃
∗(푑+
푁
2
휋)][
∂훽푠
∂휃퐶
−
훽푠
퐶 +Δ
∂Δ
∂휃퐶
].
Since at 휆¯, as 푁 →∞,
휆¯휓휆¯ = −(1− 휆¯)
훽푠(푁 − 1)푑
∂훽푠/∂휃퐶
= −(1− 휆¯)휃∗(푣푒 + 휆¯푆)
푑
휋
→ −
푑휃∗
휋 + 2푑
(푣푒 +
2푑
휋 + 2푑
푆),
휆¯휓휆¯ + 휆¯
2휃∗(푑+
푁
2
휋)→ −
푑(휋 − 푑)
휋 + 2푑
휃∗, and Δ→
(1− 훼)휃∗휋
휋 + 2푑
(푣푒 + 푑푁),
for 푁 sufficiently large the sign of FOC is determined by
(1− 훼)휃∗
푑푣푒
휋 + 2푑
(푣푒 +
2푑
휋 + 2푑
푆)− (1− 훼)휃∗
2푑(휋 − 푑)
휋 + 2푑
[
푆 −
(1− 훼)휃∗(푣푒 + 2푑
휋+2푑푆)
퐶 + (1−훼)휃
∗휋
휋+2푑 (푣
푒 +푁푑)
(
Π
2
− 푣푒)
]
=
(1− 훼)휃∗푑
휋 + 2푑
{
푣푒 + 2푆[
푑푣푒
휋 + 2푑
− (휋 − 푑)] + (휋 − 푑)(푁휋 − 2푣푒)
(1− 훼)휃∗(푣푒 + 2푑
휋+2푑푆)
퐶 + (1−훼)휃
∗휋
휋+2푑 (푣
푒 +푁푑)
}
.
If 푑푣
푒
휋+2푑 ≥ 휋 − 푑, or if 3푑
2 ≥ 휋2, ∂ℒ
푚
∂휃퐴
is strictly positive, and so regime (iii) expands.
Even if 휋2 > 3푑2, considering the terms of 푁 , for 푁 sufficiently large, FOC is strictly
positive whenever
−
2(휋2 − 3푑2)
휋 + 2푑
푆 + (휋 − 푑)
(1− 훼)휃∗(푣푒 + 2푑
휋+2푑푆)
퐶 + (1−훼)휃
∗휋
휋+2푑 (푣
푒 +푁푑)
푁휋 > 0
⇒ 퐶 < (1− 훼)휃∗
휋푑2(휋 + 푑)
(휋 + 2푑)(휋2 − 3푑2)
푁.
As long as 휋+2푑2푑 <
푑2(휋+푑)
(휋+2푑)(휋2−3푑2)
, or, 휋4+4휋3푑+휋2푑2− 14휋푑3− 14푑4 < 0, there exists
퐶 such that regime (iii) expands when there are two searchers. Otherwise, regime (iii)
shrinks. 푄.퐸.퐷.
E An Evaluation of the Bounty System (Not for
publication)
Two straightforward questions with any bounties are: What is the correct reward, and
where does the money come from? Intuitively, the amount of bounty should reflect
the social benefit of patent challenges. This benefit is correlated with the value of
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the patented technology, and the private sector would be expected to have a better
knowledge of it. A classical problem, then, is how to elicit this information. Given the
information asymmetry between technology users and the patent-holder, the former,
especially of the high-value type, may be reluctant to report truthfully the value of the
technology if there is a significant probability of search or challenge failure. Even when
they don’t need to pay the bounty, revealing his true type may hurt the high-value
user by raising the licensing fee in case of no challenge. For the second question, we
discuss in turn whether the bounty is paid by private parties or the patent authority.
In our model, there are two candidates of private parties, technology users 퐵푖 and the
patent-holder 퐴.
□ Bounty paid by technology users: Given the ex post participation con-
straint, i.e., the option of not using the technology, to require technology users to pay
the bounty is equivalent to granting patent rights to the successful challenger. The
same collusion problem emerges if the bounty is not large enough. If the amount of
bounty is set by the patent authority, we end up with a compulsory licensing scheme,
a policy the court is reluctant to adopt.43
□ Private Bounty Paid by the Patent-holder: If the bounty is paid by
the patent-holder 퐴 (Thomas, 2001), this serves as a punishment to opportunistic
patenting. The quality of issued patents will improve since the incentives to apply for
a bogus patent are lower. A risk of this punishment is to dampen R&D incentives
if there is some probability of ‘type II’ error, i.e. a good patent (when 푘 = 퐾) is
struck down.44 To incorporate pecuniary punishment, let’s relax the limited liability
constraint.45 An argument that a private bounty may not be optimal, then, serves to
justify this constraint.
For simplicity, we consider the single-user case under uninformed search.46 To
43And for a complete evaluation, compulsory licensing should also be applied to the original patent-holder.
44Among others, this error may come from the patent authority’s improper treatment of non-obviousness
criterion. For instance, hindsight bias may give rise to the wrong perception that, after realization, an
invention is easier to achieve than it actually was.
45This may not always be feasible. For instance, even large firms will spin off smaller entities to market
the patent licenses if they have to pay damages. This will make them ‘judgement-proof,’ i.e. the spin-offs
have shallow pockets and won’t pay damages.
46In the multi-user case, this bounty by itself cannot deter collusion, as it is merely a zero-sum transfer
between the two colluding parties. The gains from collusion, i.e. the rent extracted from other users, are not
affected. But a bounty changes the threat point at the collusion bargaining, and reduces the return from
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introduce type II error, suppose for any 훽, there is a probability 휀훽 ∈ (0, 훽) to find the
prior art when 푘 = 퐾. When finding the information, the updated probability that
푘 = 0 is
(1− 훼)훽
훼휀훽 + (1− 훼)훽
=
(1− 훼)
훼휀+ (1− 훼)
.
Type II error thus dilutes the information value of prior art. But we keep 휀 small enough
so that the prior art remains an informative signal about 푘 = 0, and assume the patent
authority invalidates the patent after submission, 휃퐴 = 0.47 A policy consists of two
elements: The patent protection 휃¯ when there is no challenge, and the bounty 푏 ≥ 0
paid by 퐴 when the prior art is submitted. Given a pair (휃¯, 푏), expected profits are
푈ℎ퐴 = (1 − 휀훽)휃¯휋 −퐾 − 휀훽푏 for an honest inventor, and 푈
표
퐴 = (1 − 훽)휃¯휋 − 훽푏 for an
opportunistic inventor. 퐵’s payoff is 푈퐵 = 훼[(1− 휃¯)푣
푒+휀훽(푏+ 휃¯푣푒)]+(1−훼)(1−푧)푣푒+
(1−훼)푧[(1− 휃¯)푣푒+훽(푏+ 휃¯푣푒)]− 푐(훽), where 푧 is the probability that an opportunistic
inventor applies for a patent. The innovation incentive constraint is 푈ℎ퐴 ≥ 0. When it
is satisfied, social welfare is
풲퐼퐼 = 훼[푣푒 − (1− 휀훽)휃¯푑−퐾] + (1− 훼)(1 − 푧)푣푒 + (1− 훼)푧[푣푒 − (1− 훽)휃¯푑]− 푐(훽).
The optimal policy exhibits a ‘bang-bang’ property: Either there is no deterrence
(푧 = 1 and 푏 = 0), or opportunistic patenting is fully deterred (푧 = 0). The latter,
however, may not be feasible.
Lemma 5. (Bang-bang property). Suppose 휀 > 0. The optimal policy is either no
bounty, 푏 = 0 and 푈표퐴 > 0, or a deterrence bounty, 푏 > 0 and 푈
ℎ
퐴 = 푈
표
퐴 = 푧 = 0.
Proof. For the no-deterrence regime: When 휀 and 훽 > 0, for any 푏 ≥ 0, to satisfy
푈ℎ퐴 ≥ 0 we must set 휃¯ > 휃
∗. If at 푏 > 0, 푈표퐴 > 0 and so the opportunistic inventor
applies for a patent for sure, a small reduction of 푏 doesn’t alter this behavior. But
this change decreases 휃¯ and search intensity 훽. Both increase welfare under single-user
case. Next, consider the deterrence regime, 푈ℎ퐴 ≥ 0 ≥ 푈
표
퐴.
⋄ If 푈표퐴 < 0, then 푧 = 0. If we keep 휃¯ the same but slightly decrease 푏 while maintaining
푈표퐴 < 0, then 훽 is reduced and 푈
ℎ
퐴 increases. This reduction in 푏 is feasible and welfare-
enhancing.
opportunistic patenting. This will improve the patent quality and alleviate the collusion problem because of
its rarer occurrence.
47There is no point to punish the inventor by 푏 and reward her with 휃퐴 at the same time.
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⋄ If 푈ℎ퐴 > 0. From previous result,
푈표퐴 = 0⇒ 휃¯휋 =
훽푏
1 + 훽
⇒ 푈ℎ퐴 =
1− 휀
1− 훽
훽푏−퐾 > 0.
Reduce 휃¯ by a small amount 훿휃 < 0 while keeping 푏 the same. To keep 푈
표
퐴 = 0, the
new equilibrium must have a lower 훽. Denote the change as 훿훽 < 0. For this to be
true,
(1− 훼)(푏+ 휃¯푣푒)훿푧 + [훼휀 + (1− 훼)푧]푣
푒훿휃 < 0⇒ 훿푧 < −
[훼휀+ (1− 훼)푧]푣푒훿휃
(1− 훼)(푏+ 휃¯푣푒)
,
where 훿푧 ≷ 0 is the change of 푧. Social welfare is changed by
훿풲 = −푑[훼(1− 휀훽) + (1− 훼)푧(1 − 훽)]훿휃 − (1− 훼)(1− 훽)휃¯푑훿푧 − [훼휀+ (1− 훼)푧]푏훿훽
> −푑훿휃
{
훼(1 − 휀훽) + (1− 훼)푧(1 − 훽)−
[훼휀 + (1− 훼)푧](1 − 훽)푣푒휃¯
푏+ 휃¯푣푒
}
− [훼휀+ (1− 훼)푧]푏훿훽 .
It can be seen that 훿풲 > 0. As long as the change is small enough, and so 훿훽 not too
large, we can keep 푈ℎ퐴 > 0. This change is feasible.
For the optimality of 푧 = 0, from 푈ℎ퐴 = 푈
표
퐴 = 0, in equilibrium the patent protection
required 휃¯푑 is solely determined by퐾,휋, and 휀, and the search intensity 훽푑 is decreasing
in 푏. Since an opportunistic inventor is indifferent between applying for a patent or
not, and a low 훽 increases social welfare, it is optimal to select 푧 = 0. 푄.퐸.퐷.
At the no-deterrence regime, a bounty 푏 > 0 has no direct welfare effect, but
it increases search intensity 훽 and the necessary patent protection 휃¯ to encourage
innovation. Both decrease social welfare. On the other hand, if the patent authority
wants to deter opportunistic patenting, at the optimal policy there is full deterrence,
푧 = 0, and the bounty is set at no more than necessary, i.e. 푈표퐴 = 0, since raising 푏
entails a cost of an increase in 휃¯.
We first claim that when 휀 > 0, the deterrence bounty may not be feasible. To show
this, note that the condition 푈표퐴 ≤ 0 imposes a lower bound on 푏: 훽푏 ≥ (1−훽)휃¯휋, which
then implies an upper bound on 푈ℎ퐴: 푈
ℎ
퐴 ≤ (1−휀훽)휃¯휋−퐾−휀(1−훽)휃¯휋 = (1−휀)휃¯휋−퐾.
But if
(1− 휀)휋 < 퐾 ≤ (1− 휀훽0)휋, (15)
where 훽0 is the search intensity when 푏 = 0, there is no feasible patent policy 휃¯ ≤ 1 to
implement such a bounty. Condition (15) holds for a high type II error 휀, or a large 퐾
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so that an honest inventor already needs a very strong patent protection 휃¯ absent any
punishment.
Second, we show that the deterrence bounty may be too costly. Suppose 퐾 ≤
(1− 휀)휋. From Lemma 5, in any deterrence equilibrium 푈ℎ퐴 = 푈
표
퐴 = 0, then
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휃¯푑 =
퐾
(1− 휀)휋
, 훽푑 =
퐾
퐾 + (1− 휀)푏푑
, where 훼휀
(
푏푑 + 푣푒
퐾
(1− 휀)휋
)
≡ 푐′
(
퐾
퐾 + (1− 휀)푏푑
)
.
While in the no-deterrence regime, the optimal policy is
휃¯푛 =
퐾
(1− 휀훽푛)휋
, where [훼휀+ (1− 훼)]
퐾
(1 − 휀훽푛)휋
푣푒 ≡ 푐′(훽푛).
We have 휃¯푛 < 휃¯푑 and 훽푛 ≷ 훽푑. The difference of social welfare is
풲퐼퐼(휃¯푑, 훽푑)−풲퐼퐼(휃¯푛, 훽푛) = (1− 훼)(1 − 훽푛)휃¯푑+ 훼[(휃¯푛 − 휃¯푑)− 휀(훽푛휃¯푛 − 훽푑휃¯푑)]푑− [푐(훽푑)− 푐(훽푛)].
Suppose both the cost difference and 휀 are not large enough to dominate the com-
parison. Relative to no deterrence, the deterrence policy increases social welfare by
thwarting opportunistic patenting that cannot be detected by 훽푛, at the expense of a
higher protection 휃푑 in order to compensate an honest inventor. A higher 훼 makes it
more costly to deter opportunistic patenting, and it may not be optimal to do so.49
Proposition 9. (Limits of private bounty). When there is type II error, (i) the deter-
rence bounty is not feasible if condition (15) holds; and (ii) even feasible, it is not
optimal to deter opportunistic patenting with bounties if the quality of issued patents
(훼) is not too low.
□ Public bounty: Lastly, let us consider a bounty financed by public funds. To
keep consistency, public funds are assumed available to reward the innovation as well,
i.e., a prize scheme is also included. We compare different policy combinations: Using
the public fund only to encourage innovation (a research grant), only to encourage
patent challenge (a public bounty), to do both, or none.50
In general, public funds also entail social cost. Instead of the standard shadow cost
of tax collection, we resort to the patent authority’s information constraint. Suppose
48The existence of optimal 푏푑 > 0 is guaranteed by the property of cost function 푐, especially 푐′(1) =∞.
49It is easy to confirm this point with a two-point searching technology, i.e. 퐵 has an exogenous probability
훽 to find the prior art by incurring a fixed search cost.
50We don’t let the patent authority mix the two regimes at the same stage, e.g., we don’t allow the patent
authority to reward an inventor partly by patent and partly by a prize. Given the model’s linear structure
this should not be a restriction.
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that there is a mass푀 of rent-seekers, who can ‘attack’ a prize or public bounty system
by producing fake patent applications and defeating prior arts with a very small cost
훿 > 0. By a fake patent application, we mean one seeks to patent an invention that
has no value, and there exists evidence to show that it doesn’t meet the patentability
criteria. Suppose 퐴 is not among those rent-seekers,51 but the patent authority cannot
distinguish between a patent application from 퐴 or a rent-seeker.
Consider our basic model, the case of multiple-user with single searcher. For sim-
plicity, we ignore the search cost and fix the search intensity 훽. Assume that the policy
cannot depend on the volume of patent applications or challenges.52 When patents are
the only policy tool, the patent authority’s optimization program is (풫)푠 in Section
3, with 푐 = 0 and 훽 fixed. Absent search cost, the optimal re-allocation is governed
by collusion concerns (regime (ii)). The patent-holder gets a patent with 휃∗ when no
challenge, and the challenger gets 휆휃∗ by submitting the prior art. Since a patent is
useless to them, no rent-seekers will spend 훿 to produce fake applications. When public
funds are introduced, consider where the money is spent:
Challenge only (a public bounty but not a prize system): To overcome the collusion
problem the bounty should be at least 휆휃∗푆. The patent is entirely invalidated after
the challenge, and full production surplus 푉 푒 is realized. But a positive bounty attracts
rent-seekers. Each of them incurs 훿 to apply for a patent and then invalidates it, with
social welfare
풲푐 = 훼(푉 푒 − 휃∗퐷 −퐾) + (1− 훼)[(1 − 훽)(푉 푒 − 휃∗퐷) + 훽푉 푒]− 훿푀
= 푉 푒 − [훼+ (1− 훼)(1 − 훽)]휃∗퐷 − 훼퐾 − 훿푀 ;
Innovation plus challenge : If no patent rights are granted, there is no efficiency
loss on production. To encourage innovation, the research prize should be at least
퐾 > 0; and to encourage challenge, the bounty should be at least as large as the
research prize.53 Rent-seekers rush to the patent office to win the higher of these two.
51Alternatively, we can assume that 퐴 has the ability to produce the bogus and useless patent, but this
activity doesn’t crowd out her effort to spend 푘 and bring the useful innovation.
52Since the patent authority cannot discriminate a useful invention from a fake invention, doing so simply
dilutes the reward to a true inventor.
53Note that a challenge doesn’t improve social welfare here, for, again, we’ve assumed away the incentive
effect of the challenge on innovation. Instead, if 퐴 chooses between a research project requiring cost 퐾, or
applying for a prize on an existing technology (with zero cost) and risk the challenge, then to encourage
innovation the authority cannot simply distribute money to any applicant. The challenge is necessary to
44
Social welfare is
풲 푖+푐 = 훼(푉 푒 −퐾) + (1− 훼)푉 푒 − 훿푀 = 푉 푒 − 훼퐾 − 훿푀 ;
Innovation only : Suppose the patent authority rewards innovation with a prize
푏푝 ≥ 퐾, and encourages prior art submission with collusion-deterrence patent rights
휃푝. Rent-seekers incur 훿푀 to get the prize 푏푝, but will not challenge it. Social welfare
is
풲 푖 = 훼(푉 푒 −퐾) + (1− 훼)[(1 − 훽)푉 푒 + 훽(푉 푒 − 휃푝(푁 − 1)푑)] − 훿푀
= 푉 푒 − (1− 훼)훽휃푝(푁 − 1)푑 − 훼퐾 − 훿푀.
It is not surprising to see that public funds should not be used under heavy rent-
seeking activity. For 푀 large enough, a pure patent system is superior to alternatives
incorporating public funds. A more interesting point is that, a pure reward scheme
dominates the other two mixed regimes: 풲 푖+푐 is greater than풲 푖 and풲푐. This implies
that, if we don’t want to abandon the patent system and switch to the prize system,
probably we should not adopt the public bounty either.
Proposition 10. (Public bounty). The effectiveness of using public funds in the inno-
vation policy is constrained by the rent-seeking problem. And a pure public bounty is
not optimal.
Remark. Here using public funds only entails a ‘fixed cost’ 훿푀 . Therefor, once this cost
is incurred, the full advantage of public funds should be exhausted, and there is no point
to mix it with the patent system and generate additional social loss. Alternatively, a
‘variable cost’ component presents if there is another group of heterogeneous rent-
seekers, each has different costs to fabricate the fake invention. The social cost of
public fund then is increasing in the size of monetary reward because a higher reward
attracts more rent-seekers. This makes public bounty more attractive than a research
prize, for to deter collusion it suffices to post a bounty of 휆휃∗푆 < 휃∗(푁 − 1)휋 < 퐾.
Nevertheless, our result holds as long as the fixed cost component is large enough. ∥
overcome 퐴’s moral hazard problem. With probability 훽 and a prize 푅, the incentive constraint is
푅−퐾 ≥ (1 − 훽)푅⇒ 훽푅 ≥ 퐾.
Without challenge (훽 = 0), this constraint cannot be satisfied.
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